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Abstract

This Article argues that the “reasonableness” requirement of Title VII should be rejected. Under this approach,
a plaintiff ’s complaint would be protected unless the defendant could establish that the plaintiff was acting in
bad faith at the time she made the complaint. Such a standard would offer employers some protection from
retaliation suits based on frivolous complaints without compromising the significant goals the retaliation
provision can serve. Part I provides background on Title VII and the anti-retaliation provision, particularly the
“opposition” clause, explains why the anti-retaliation provision is necessary and how courts have interpreted
the scope of the conduct it protects, and identifies the problem with the current approach, namely, that the
“reasonableness” requirement provides too little clarity as to what conduct is protected and gives courts a
powerful tool by which they can limit the scope of protected conduct under the statute. Part I concludes with
a discussion of the D.C. and Fourth Circuit decisions that illustrate the problems this approach creates. Part II
explains why these decisions are so problematic, especially in the context of hostile work environment claims,
examines how these courts’ definitions of the term “reasonableness” threaten to undercut the anti-retaliation
provision’s effectiveness by discouraging harassment victims from reporting what they are experiencing,
especially in the earliest stages of the harassment, and then argues that the way to address this problem is not
to craft some alternative definition of the term reasonable; rather, the better approach is to reject the
“reasonableness” requirement altogether. Part III explores the benefits of this approach and discusses how a
stronger anti-retaliation provision will serve Title VII’s myriad goals. These benefits relate, in part, to
enforcement: Individuals will be more likely to report conduct if they believe that their complaint will be
protected, and this approach will also facilitate more informal methods of resolving harassment claims. But
the benefits go beyond enforcement. By encouraging individuals to report harassment, the anti-retaliation
provision can facilitate a change in the norms that govern the workplace and can ameliorate the harms that
harassment causes.
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INTRODUCTION
Enacted to facilitate enforcement of Title VII’s prohibitions on
workplace discrimination, the statute’s anti-retaliation provision has
received neither the attention nor the acclaim that has been focused
on the statute as a whole.
To the contrary, its
significance⎯particularly its potential significance if interpreted
appropriately⎯has been underappreciated by commentators and
courts alike. Although courts have acknowledged the important role
the provision plays in encouraging the reporting of Title VII
1
violations, the provision can⎯and should⎯play a much more
significant role in achieving the goals Title VII was enacted to realize.
2
Title VII prohibits discrimination in the workplace, but it is more
than a top-down enforcement mechanism, imposing equality values
on an unwilling society. It also plays a fundamental role in radically
reshaping societal norms in a way that can facilitate meaningful
3
change from the bottom-up. And just as Title VII does more than
simply provide a rule of liability for those who discriminate, the antiretaliation provision can do more than facilitate the imposition of
that liability.
By ensuring that individuals report possible
discrimination, it can facilitate open communication about what
conduct violates that norm, and it can help victims cope with, and
recover from, the psychological and dignitary harms that such
discrimination often causes. But if the anti-retaliation provision is
interpreted too narrowly, such that it often fails to protect individuals
who report conduct that they believe violates Title VII, it will be
unable to serve any of these purposes.
1. See, e.g., Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2412 (2006)
(noting that Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision “secur[es] [Title VII’s] primary
objective by preventing an employer from interfering (through retaliation) with an
employee’s efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the Act’s basic guarantees”).
2. More specifically, the statute makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000). With this broad prohibition, Title VII is the
primary federal law regulating discrimination in the workplace. Although other
pieces of federal legislation govern aspects of the employment relationship, they are,
generally speaking, more narrow in scope. See, e.g., The Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29
U.S.C. § 206(d) (2000) (proscribing wage discrimination on the basis of sex);
Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2000)
(prohibiting age discrimination in employment).
3. By rejecting the idea that racial stereotypes and gender norms are acceptable,
Title VII has helped to create a widespread societal commitment to the equality
principle. In this sense, Title VII is what Linda Hamilton Krieger has described as a
“transformative law,” one “aimed at changing social norms which it perceives to be
unjust or otherwise undesirable.” Linda Hamilton Krieger, Afterword: Socio-Legal
Backlash, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 476, 479 (2000).
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Yet the interpretation that courts currently give the provision’s
“opposition” clause suffers from just this flaw. Under the opposition
clause, an employer may not “discriminate against any of his
employees . . . because [the employee] has opposed any practice
4
made an unlawful employment practice” by Title VII. In Clark County
5
School District v. Breeden, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff
could not prevail on his retaliation claims because “no one could
reasonably believe that the incident [he experienced] violated Title
6
VII.”
The Court did not evaluate possible alternatives to this
“reasonableness” requirement; nor did it offer any justification for it.
Instead, it merely assumed that was the appropriate standard because
7
it was the one the Ninth Circuit had applied below. Indeed, prior to
Clark County, the courts of appeals had overwhelmingly converged on
this standard, denying a plaintiff legal protection under the
provision’s “opposition” clause for any retaliation experienced, unless
the plaintiff could establish a “good faith, reasonable belief that the
8
challenged practice violate[d]” the statute.
This standard was originally articulated in response to claims that
the provision should be construed to protect only individuals who
9
opposed practices that were actually unlawful under the statute. In
response to such arguments, the courts expressed concerns that
“[s]uch a narrow interpretation . . . would not only chill the
legitimate assertion of employee rights under Title VII but would
tend to force employees to file formal charges rather than seek
10
conciliation or informal adjustment of grievances.” Yet at the same

4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
5. 532 U.S. 268 (2001) (per curiam).
6. Id. at 270.
7. Id.
8. See infra note 10 (noting several courts of appeals decisions in support of a
“good faith, reasonable belief” standard under the opposition clause).
9. See, e.g., Sias v. City Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 1978)
(discussing the arguments against a narrow interpretation of the opposition clause).
10. Id.; see Payne v. McLemore’s Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1139
(5th Cir. Unit A Sept. 1981) (“[I]nterpreting the opposition clause to protect an
employee who reasonably believes that discrimination exists is consistent with a
liberal construction of Title VII to implement the Congressional purpose of
eliminating discrimination in employment.”) (internal quotation marks & citation
omitted); Parker v. Balt. & Ohio Ry. Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(“[M]aking the protected nature of an employee’s opposition to alleged
discrimination depend on the ultimate resolution of his claim would be inconsistent
with the remedial purposes of Title VII.”); Berg v. La Crosse Cooler Co., 612 F.2d
1041, 1045 (7th Cir. 1980) (noting that “[t]he district court’s literal reading
undermines Title VII’s central purpose, the elimination of employment
discrimination by informal means; destroys one of the chief means of achieving that
purpose, the frank and nondisruptive exchange of ideas between employers and
employees; and serves no redeeming statutory or policy purposes of its own”).

GOROD.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC

1472

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

8/6/2007 10:15:25 PM

[Vol. 56:6

time, the courts recognized the need to provide employers with some
11
protection against retaliation claims based on frivolous complaints,
and the courts determined that “[t]he employer is sufficiently
protected against malicious accusations and frivolous claims by a
requirement that an employee seeking the protection of the
opposition clause demonstrate a good faith, reasonable belief that
12
the challenged practice violates Title VII.”
Yet this standard, originally intended to construe the opposition
clause liberally in service of Title VII’s broad remedial purposes, has
paradoxically had the opposite effect, providing too little protection
for employees in return for too little benefit to employers. This result
was in some sense inevitable: “Reasonableness” is, in any context, an
13
amorphous concept.
The difficulties in relying on it as a
decisionmaking tool are only compounded in the context of sexual
harassment, which is itself a nebulous concept because the unlawful
conduct generally occurs not in one discrete act, but in repeated
instances of harassment over time. This makes it difficult to know
14
where exactly the line between the lawful and the unlawful lies. The
ambiguity of the line was bound to make it difficult for plaintiffs to
know when their complaint would be protected and when it would
not.
But two recent courts of appeals decisions illustrate how the
“reasonableness” requirement can be used to narrow considerably

11. Parker, 652 F.2d at 1020 (asserting that “[c]ourts have recognized the need to
balance the employer’s interest in smooth functioning of his business against
employees’ interest in achieving internal resolution of discrimination disputes”).
Although employers remain free to fire employees who complain so long as they can
establish a lawful reason for doing so, that does not mean frivolous complaints are
not without costs to employers. Employers must investigate such complaints, and if
they do decide to fire the employee, the costs of litigating a retaliation claim can be
substantial, even if the employer ultimately prevails.
This concern with balancing the rights of employees and the legitimate business
interests of employers is a theme that pervades much of Title VII case law, including
interpretations of the substantive anti-discrimination provision. See Elizabeth
Chambliss, Title VII as a Displacement of Conflict, 6 TEMPLE POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 1, 5
(1996) (stating that opponents of Title VII “feared federal regulation, and the
creation of a ‘despotic’ regulatory agency that would ‘subject a great part of
American industry to bureaucratic whims, prejudices and caprices’” (quoting 1
STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS 1298 (Bernard Schwartz ed.,
1970) (remarks of Sen. Tower))).
12. Parker, 652 F.2d at 1020.
13. Cf. Edward A. Marshall, Title VII’s Participation Clause and Circuit City Stores v.
Adams: Making the Foxes Guardians of the Chickens, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 71, 89
(2003) (claiming that “[t]he rigor with which the lower courts have applied the
subject matter reasonableness requirement has varied from circuit to circuit”).
14. See infra Part II.A (elaborating on the difficulty in defining sexual
harassment).
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the protections the anti-retaliation provision offers. In one decision,
the D.C. Circuit suggested that a plaintiff’s belief that conduct was
unlawful could satisfy the “reasonableness” requirement only if a
reasonable juror could find that the alleged discrimination was a
16
violation of Title VII, thereby effectively holding individuals
accountable for knowing the Title VII case law. This result is
especially troubling in the context of sexual harassment, where the
general public’s perception of what is unlawful likely does not align
17
with the definition provided in the case law. In the other decision,
the Fourth Circuit held that a plaintiff who complained about an
incident of harassing behavior that was not yet unlawful, but would be
if repeated, could establish that his belief was reasonable only if he
could establish that he had reason to believe that the conduct would
18
continue.
This decision, thus, applied the “reasonableness”
requirement in a way that discourages individuals from reporting
harassment when it first occurs.
These decisions are especially problematic given the significant
role that the anti-retaliation provision, more broadly construed, could
play in serving the larger objectives of Title VII. This Article argues
that the better approach would be to reject the “reasonableness”
requirement. Under this approach, a plaintiff’s complaint would be
protected unless the defendant could establish that the plaintiff was
acting in bad faith at the time she made the complaint. Such a
standard would offer employers some protection from retaliation
suits based on frivolous complaints without compromising the
significant goals the retaliation provision can serve.
Part I provides background on Title VII and the anti-retaliation
provision, particularly the “opposition” clause. It explains why the
anti-retaliation provision is necessary and how courts have
interpreted the scope of the conduct it protects. It then begins to
identify the problem with the current approach, namely, that the
“reasonableness” requirement provides too little clarity as to what
conduct is protected and gives courts a powerful tool by which they
can limit the scope of protected conduct under the statute. Part I
concludes with a discussion of the D.C. and Fourth Circuit decisions
that illustrate the problems this approach creates.
15. Jordan v. Alternative Res. Corp., 458 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2006); George v.
Leavitt, 407 F.3d 405 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
16. George, 407 F.3d at 416.
17. See infra Part II.A (explaining the public’s difficulty in distinguishing between
“offensive” conduct, which is lawful under the statute, and “abusive” conduct, which
is unlawful under the statute).
18. Jordan, 458 F.3d at 332.
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Part II explains why these decisions are so problematic, especially
in the context of hostile work environment claims. It examines how
these courts’ definitions of the term “reasonableness” threaten to
undercut the anti-retaliation provision’s effectiveness by discouraging
harassment victims from reporting what they are experiencing,
especially in the earliest stages of the harassment. It then argues that
the way to address this problem is not to craft some alternative
definition of the term reasonable; rather, the better approach is to
reject the “reasonableness” requirement altogether.
Originally
designed to balance the rights of employees and the legitimate
business interests of employers, the “reasonableness” requirement
offers relatively little help to employers in comparison to the
significant harms it imposes on harassment victims. A better balance
would be achieved if courts rejected this requirement and instead
protected a plaintiff’s complaint unless the employer could show that
the complaint was made in bad faith.
Part III explores the benefits of this approach and discusses how a
stronger anti-retaliation provision will serve Title VII’s myriad goals.
These benefits relate, in part, to enforcement: Individuals will be
more likely to report conduct if they believe that their complaint will
be protected, and this approach will also facilitate more informal
methods of resolving harassment claims. But the benefits go beyond
enforcement. By encouraging individuals to report harassment, the
anti-retaliation provision can facilitate a change in the norms that
govern the workplace and can ameliorate the harms that harassment
causes.
I.

BACKGROUND

For most workers around the country, Title VII is their foremost
source of protection from on-the-job discrimination. Consistent with
its libertarian roots, the employment sector in this country historically
operated on an at-will basis in which both employers and employees,
19
at least theoretically, had maximum freedom of movement, and
20
employees could be fired for any cause or for no cause at all. Title
19. See, e.g., Clyde W. Summers, Employment at Will in the United States: The Divine
Right of Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 65 (2000) (stating that the doctrine of
at-will employment “has been, and still is, a basic premise undergirding American
labor law”); see also Pauline T. Kim, Genetic Discrimination, Genetic Privacy: Rethinking
Employee Protections for a Brave New Workplace, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1497, 1515-16 (2002)
(“Prior to [Title VII’s] passage, employment was viewed primarily as a private
contract between employer and employee. The law generally did not interfere with
personnel decisions regardless of their unfairness or irrationality.”).
20. See, e.g., Deborah A. Ballam, Employment-At-Will: The Impending Death of a
Doctrine, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 653, 653 (2000) (explaining that “the employment
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VII, however, places some constraints on this freedom by making
21
some causes of termination impermissible. It also makes it unlawful
for employers to treat employees differently on account of the
protected characteristics of race, religion, gender, and national
22
origin. Thus, when Title VII was passed as part of the Civil Rights
23
Act of 1964, it marked, at least theoretically, an important watershed
in the history of the United States’s treatment of both civil rights and
24
the employment sector.
A. Title VII
In the workplace, perhaps more than any other institution in this
country, individuals with different backgrounds and beliefs come
25
together and interact. As a result, the workplace provides a space in
relationship, absent a contract to the contrary, is ‘at-will’ meaning that either the
employer or the employee can terminate the relationship at any time for any reason,
even for no reason, without legal liability attaching”).
21. For an argument that Title VII’s limitations on the at-will employment
doctrine have been rendered largely illusory by recent Supreme Court decisions, see
generally William R. Corbett, The “Fall” of Summers, the Rise of “Pretext Plus,” and the
Escalating Subordination of Federal Employment Discrimination Law to Employment at Will:
Lessons from McKennon and Hicks, 30 GA. L. REV. 305, 332 (1996) (arguing that
“management prerogatives are being used to suppress the discrimination laws” and
“once the whole of discrimination law is weakened by the results in the individual
cases, employment at will is left reigning over the landscape of employment relations
because fewer victims of discrimination are willing to sue given their small chances of
prevailing”).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
23. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241.
24. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract At Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV.
947, 947 (1984) (describing the passage of Title VII as the embodiment of the
second “major statutory revolution[]” in the area of employer-employee relations);
Ronald Turner, Thirty Years of Title VII’s Regulatory Regime: Rights, Theories, and
Realities, 46 ALA. L. REV. 375, 379 (1995) [hereinafter Turner, Thirty Years] (noting
that the Civil Rights Act has been hailed as “the greatest liberal achievement of the
decade and the most important civil rights legislation of this century”) (internal
quotations & footnote omitted). While Title VII offered the promise of significant
change in this area, the extent to which it has realized that promise remains the
subject of significant dispute. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Sex
Discrimination Laws, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1311, 1334 (1989) (“What has been the net
effect of the cascade of laws and lawsuits aimed at eliminating sex discrimination in
employment? This is maddeningly difficult to say, but it is possible that women as a
whole have not benefited and have in fact suffered.”); Turner, Thirty Years, supra, at
470 (noting that “Title VII protection of incumbent employees may provide
employers with a disincentive to hire blacks or members of other protected groups”).
25. According to commentator Cynthia S. Estlund:
[T]he workplace is perhaps the most important sphere in which significant
integration has taken place. . . . [I]t is an arena in which individuals interact
on a daily basis, often over years, within a common enterprise which
necessitates, to varying degrees, trust and cooperation. The workplace is
thus one of the very few settings in which adults spend a significant amount
of time interacting intensively and constructively with others from different
families, different neighborhoods, different religions, and, importantly,
different racial and ethnic groups.
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which individuals can learn to see beyond stereotypes and to
recognize the superficialities of the differences that still too often
26
divide us. At the same time, the diversity of the workplace also
makes it readily susceptible to hostility and tension, at times
27
intentional and at other times not. Primarily enacted to provide
minorities who were then openly excluded from many jobs greater
28
access to employment opportunities, Title VII’s protections were
subsequently extended to protect individuals, first minorities and
29
later women, from workplace harassment. Despite federal, state,
and local laws all designed to eliminate such harassment in the
30
31
workplace, there is considerable evidence that it remains pervasive.
Employment laws initially enacted to address explicit discrimination
Cynthia S. Estlund, The Workplace in a Racially Diverse Society: Preliminary Thoughts on
the Role of Labor and Employment Law, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 49, 52-53 (1998).
26. See id. at 62 (“[T]he existence of racially integrated workplaces is a matter of
critical societal importance . . . because they create arenas for continual, constructive
social interaction among individuals of different racial groups in a society in which
this is still too infrequent.”); cf. EARL BLACK & MERLE BLACK, POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN
THE SOUTH 56-57, 72, 170 (1987) (observing that the political alignment of workingclass whites and blacks helped improve interracial social relationships in the South).
27. Estlund, supra note 25, at 55-56 (observing that “the workplace, like other
intermediate institutions, can become an enclave of intolerance, exclusion,
provinciality, and prejudice on the basis of race, sex, religion, and other salient lines
of social division”).
28. Turner, Thirty Years, supra note 24, at 380.
29. In one of the earliest cases recognizing the possibility of so-called “hostile
work environment” claims under Title VII, Judge Goldberg of the Fifth Circuit
explained that “[o]ne can readily envision working environments so heavily polluted
with discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional and psychological stability
of minority group workers, and I think Section 703 of Title VII was aimed at the
eradication of such noxious practices.” Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir.
1971). Liberal constructions of Title VII’s proscriptions, coupled with important
theoretical works on the serious problem posed by sexual harassment, see CATHARINE
A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX
DISCRIMINATION 1 (1979), led courts to recognize Title VII claims based on sexual
harassment.
30. See, e.g., William M. Landes, The Economics of Fair Employment Laws, 76 J. POL.
ECON. 507, 507 (1968) (noting the proliferation of state fair employment laws and
commissions on discrimination established by municipalities to “supplement the
state commissions”); see also David C. Belt, Election of Remedies in Employment
Discrimination Law: Doorway into the Legal Hall of Mirrors, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 145,
156 (1995) (“While only half the states had comprehensive fair employment practices
laws at the time of Title VII’s enactment, forty-nine states now have such legislation.
Much of the current state legislation is broader in coverage than federal legislation.”)
(internal footnotes omitted); Sarah E. Wald, Alternatives to Title VII: State Statutory and
Common-Law Remedies for Employment Discrimination, 5 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 35, 41
(1982) (explaining that forty-two states have fair employment practices laws and
“most mirror the general protections of Title VII”).
31. See, e.g., Carrie A. Bond, Note, Shattering the Myth: Mediating Sexual Harassment
Disputes in the Workplace, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2489, 2489 (1997) (“Studies put the
incidence of sexual harassment at fifty percent to eighty percent of all working
women, with five percent of men and fifteen percent of women suffering sexual
harassment each year.”) (internal footnotes omitted).
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in hiring and firing are not always well-equipped to address more
32
subtle forms of harassment.
In its efforts to achieve its various goals, Title VII has supported
both an ideology and a vision—an ideology about the significance of
equality in this country and a vision of what a workplace in which that
ideology was realized would look like. While there have been
tremendous strides toward the realization of that vision since Title VII
33
was first enacted, much remains to be done.
The ideology of
equality has been largely accepted, at least in theory, but its promise
has not yet been realized. Different groups are not yet equally
34
positioned in the workplace, and the norms that govern the

32. See, e.g., Tristin K. Green, Targeting Workplace Conduct: Title VII as a Tool for
Institutional Reform, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 659, 659 (2003) (“Discrimination in the
workplace today is increasingly less a problem of overt employer policies or targeted
discriminatory animus than it is a problem of subtle, often unconscious, bias
creeping into everyday social interactions and judgments on the job.”) (internal
footnote omitted); see also John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing
Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 983-84 (1991)
(observing that “[t]he nature of employment discrimination litigation in the federal
courts . . . has changed considerably since Title VII went into effect . . . . Although
the authors and early architects of employment discrimination laws envisioned them
as tools for opening employment opportunities to blacks, women, and other
minorities, this is no longer their primary use.”); Ronald Turner, A Look at Title VII’s
Regulatory Regime, 16 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 219, 236-37 (1994) [hereinafter Turner, A
Look] (noting that “employers face a diminished risk of Title VII hiring suits”
because, in part, “an applicant who is not hired by a company may be less likely to
suspect, and most likely will not be in a position to shape, and prove, a claim of
discrimination”).
33. See, e.g., Ann C. Hodges, The Limits of Multiple Rights and Remedies: A Call for
Revisiting the Law of the Workplace, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 601, 601 (2005)
(claiming that Title VII has produced “obvious substantial improvements in
distribution of jobs on the basis of race, gender, and ethnicity, and a reduction in the
earnings gap between whites and blacks and men and women,” but that it “has
neither eliminated discrimination in the workplace nor [produced] complete
equality”); cf. Turner, Thirty Years, supra note 24, at 474 (“Title VII has, to some
extent, benefited many African-Americans, as exemplified by the rise and existence
of a black middle class. The statute has been effective to the extent that employers
no longer overtly discriminate . . . . Aside from these general observations, the
available evidence on the impact of Title VII is meager.”).
34. See, e.g., Michele Hoyman & Lamont Stallworth, Suit Filing by Women: An
Empirical Analysis, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 61, 61 (1986) (“[T]he data suggests that
the economic status of women, as indicated by wage differentials and occupational
segregation, has changed very little relative to white males.”); Symposium, Department
of Justice and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 26 PAC. L.J. 765, 795, 798-99 (1995)
[hereinafter Symposium, Civil Rights Act] (noting that there have been some
improvements in occupation distribution and wage differentials, but that wage
differences remain); id. (observing that “unemployment rates for racial minorities
have remained stubbornly higher than the unemployment rates for Caucasians”);
Posner, supra note 24, at 1324 (“It is easy enough to find particular instances where
these laws opened up jobs that were previously closed to women or resulted in a
realignment of women’s pay scales, but it is difficult to see any major effects on broad
trends in women’s wages or employment.” (quoting VICTOR R. FUCHS, WOMEN’S
QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY 27 (1988))); Turner, Thirty Years, supra note 24, at
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workplace remain rooted in traditions of the past and have not yet
35
been shaped by the new realities of the present. As a result, vestiges
of the old system remain, and women and minorities still struggle to
find their place—and to make that place comfortable—in the
modern workplace.
How then to facilitate Title VII’s efforts to ensure greater progress
toward the realization of the vision it was enacted to effect? One fact
seems clear: The potential of Title VII’s promise will not be realized
if individuals are reluctant to report what they perceive to be
violations of that norm and that vision. Yet another fact is clear as
well: Individuals often are reluctant to report such violations. There
are many explanations for this reticence, one of the most obvious
36
being the fear of employer retaliation, and the statute’s antiretaliation provision has not alleviated the concerns of many
employees.
That a reluctance to report Title VII violations persists is a serious
problem because Title VII’s ability to realize its potential depends,
more so than with much other federal legislation, on the willingness
of victims of workplace discrimination to bring that discrimination to
37
light.
The remainder of this Part introduces Title VII’s antiretaliation provision and the recent decisions that threaten to curtail
its important role in effectuating the statute’s purposes.
B. Anti-Retaliation Under Title VII
The fact that retaliation victims are often afraid to report
38
discrimination can hardly be disputed. One study found that “more
than one-third of those who reported unfair treatment took no

478 (claiming that the employment sector remains, to a large degree, “racially
stratified”).
35. See infra Part III.C (arguing that the traditional stereotypes to which women
continue to be subject cause humiliation and embarrassment in the workplace,
which leads to psychological, physical, and financial damage).
36. See infra notes 38-43 and accompanying text (explaining the reluctance of
victims of sexual harassment to report harassment due to fears of retaliation).
37. See, e.g., Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 32, at 1000 (maintaining that “the
EEOC has played an essentially passive role in the growth of employment
discrimination suits”). Donohue and Siegelman explain that the EEOC “has brought
relatively few cases,” and “it seems not to have been responsible for the growth in
private litigation.” Id. at 1000. For further discussion of the EEOC’s lack of authority
to implement the statute, and the burden on individual victims to enforce the
provisions of Title VII, see infra note 134.
38. See, e.g., Michael J. Yelnosky, Title VII, Mediation, and Collective Action, 1999 U.
ILL. L. REV. 583, 587-88 (“Prospective Title VII plaintiffs worry about retaliation,
particularly if they are still employed by the defendant, and worry about being
labeled ‘trouble makers.’”).
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further action, and only 3% reported suing their employer.” While
40
other causes certainly contribute to this reluctance, fear of employer
41
One commentator
retaliation appears to be a significant factor.
revealed that “one ombudsman involved with over 6000 sexual
harassment victims” claimed that “over seventy-five percent of victims
express serious concern about some form of retaliatory or adverse
42
consequences flowing from their complaint.”
The fact that
39. Laura Beth Nielsen & Aaron Beim, Media Misrepresentation: Title VII, Print
Media, and Public Perceptions of Discrimination Litigation, 15 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 237,
241 (2004).
40. One commentator has noted “that the most common way victims deal with
harassment is not to complain, but rather, to avoid or dismiss it. These passive
strategies run from simply ignoring the harassment to transferring or quitting one’s
job.” Beth A. Quinn, The Paradox of Complaining: Law, Humor, and Harassment in the
Everyday Work World, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1151, 1154 (2000). Employees may also
worry about straining their relationships with co-workers and supervisors, even if they
do not face formal retaliation. See, e.g., Turner, Thirty Years, supra note 24, at 470-71
(questioning whether victims should be “concerned that bringing a claim may affect
[their] future relationship with [their] employer and coworkers, that [their] ongoing
employment relationship will be strained by [their] daily contact with individuals
whom [they have] identified as discriminators, or that the employer will in some way
unlawfully retaliate against [them] because [they] filed a claim”).
Some
commentators have also expressed concern that certain entities have established
affirmative roadblocks to the filing of employee complaints. See, e.g., Anne Lawton,
The Bad Apple Theory in Sexual Harassment Law, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 817, 838 (2006)
[hereinafter Lawton, Bad Apple Theory] (claiming that employers have “incentives to
make reporting more difficult” because “the lower federal courts have failed in their
oversight of employers’ judgments on how to implement anti-harassment policies
and procedures”); Nielsen & Beim, supra note 39, at 241-42 (noting the “significant
barriers confronting plaintiffs, including . . . a managerialized version of dispute
processes that favors the organization, that the EEOC turns away almost 80% of
complainants with no relief, that victims are unlikely to file suit, that plaintiffs who
file lawsuits face low chances of success, and that plaintiffs who manage to win at trial
are likely to lose on appeal”); Turner, Thirty Years, supra note 24, at 461 (highlighting
one lawyer’s concern that “EEOC investigators ‘have a strong incentive to discourage
people from making a charge that is hard to investigate’” (quoting Peter T. Kilborn,
Backlog of Cases Is Overwhelming Jobs-Bias Agency, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1994, at 10)).
41. See, e.g., Turner, A Look, supra note 32, at 239-40 (discussing employee
concerns about employer retaliation, including whether the “practical costs of
bringing a claim . . . outweigh the benefits available under the statute”); cf. Yelnosky,
supra note 38, at 621-22 (surveying the law under Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision
and concluding that it may not presently be structured to offer much assurance of
protection from employer retaliation).
42. Bond, supra note 31, at 2501; see Lawton, Bad Apple Theory, supra note 40, at
846-47 (discussing Title VII’s reliance on victim reporting in order to be successful
and noting that that the majority of victims do not report harassment to anyone in an
authority position). That many victims perceive that their complaints will do nothing
to end the behavior also explains why they see no reason to run the risk of retaliation
by complaining. See, e.g., Hoyman & Stallworth, supra note 34, at 62-63 (asserting
that women do not complain because of “the inevitable economic and non-economic
costs which the individual incurs upon filing a complaint,” “the perception which
women hold of their historical and legal status in society, particularly in the
workplace,” and because “[h]istorically, women have not fared well in the law”);
Laura Beth Nielsen, Situating Legal Consciousness: Experiences and Attitudes of Ordinary
Citizens about Law and Street Harassment, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1055, 1083-84 (2000)
(acknowledging the perception that laws are not effective in preventing harassment);
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complainants, especially in the sexual harassment context, tend to be
“wom[e]n with low income and little power” only compounds this
43
problem.
But if people do not complain, the Act’s protections will be largely
hollow, unable to help achieve the equality of opportunity that its
authors envisioned. It is for that reason that the Act required
employers to “post and keep posted in conspicuous places upon its
premises where notices to employees, applicants for employment,
and members are customarily posted a notice . . . setting forth
excerpts from or, summaries of, the pertinent provisions of this title
44
and information pertinent to the filing of a complaint.” The EEOC,
too, enacted regulations noting that “[p]revention is the best tool for
the elimination of sexual harassment” and requiring employers to
“take all steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment from occurring,
such as affirmatively raising the subject, expressing strong
disapproval, developing appropriate sanctions, informing employees
of their right to raise and how to raise the issue of harassment under
45
[T]itle VII, and developing methods to sensitize all concerned.” But
notice of these rights is meaningless if individuals do not feel
46
comfortable attempting to enforce them.
Indeed, against the

Quinn, supra note 40, at 1172 (“To use the law instrumentally requires two acts of
faith, so to speak. First, one must believe that change is possible. Second, one must
judge that the power for this change rests (at least partially) with the law.”). These
concerns about the likelihood of prevailing on their claims are hardly irrational. See,
e.g., Nielsen & Beim, supra note 39, at 257-58 (“[S]ome social scientists, legal
scholars, and potential plaintiffs view anti-discrimination law as largely ineffective in
redressing employment discrimination, as biased in favor of defendants, and as
providing very weak remedies for those who actually experience workplace
discrimination.”). Of course, if it is true, as has been noted, that the media
“portray[s] greater win rates and higher award amounts in employment
discrimination lawsuits than is the case in federal court outcomes,” id. at 251, that
may undercut somewhat this explanation for employees’ unwillingness to sue.
43. Bond, supra note 31, at 2500; see Hodges, supra note 33, at 612 (“Data . . .
indicate[s] that lower paid employees are less successful than higher paid employees
both in litigation and . . . have less access to courts.”); id. at 609 (“The cost of
litigating such claims is beyond the means of the average employee and an even
greater hurdle for the discharged employee with substantially reduced income.”).
Indeed, Donohue and Siegelman note that some believe “civil rights opponents
intended the private enforcement mechanism as a deliberate road-block to plaintiffs’
effective pursuit of their rights, especially given that ‘many of those discriminated
against would be poor and legally unsophisticated.’” Donohue & Siegelman, supra
note 32, at 1023 (quoting PAUL BURSTEIN, DISCRIMINATION, JOBS, AND POLITICS 28
(1985)).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-10(a) (2000).
45. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f).
46. It is this concern that led two commentators to question whether “relying on
individual citizens to bring suits is the most effective enforcement strategy.”
Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 32, at 1023. As they explain, “if enforcement is
left in the hands of private litigants, and if private and social incentives to bring suit
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47

backdrop of the Jim Crow system in the South, the idea that there
might be a gap between the law in theory and the law in practice
48
would be familiar to many of the Act’s intended beneficiaries.
Thus, Congress enacted the anti-retaliation provision to try to
ensure that individuals would be willing to report violations of the
49
Act. The anti-retaliation provision provides that
it [is] unlawful . . . for an employer to discriminate against any of
his employees . . . because he has opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice by this title . . . or because he has
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in
an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this title . . . .50

Although there has been considerable litigation under Title VII’s
51
anti-retaliation provision, significant questions about the scope of
that provision’s protections remain. It was only last term that the
Supreme Court began to provide guidance as to what the term
52
“discrimination” means in that context.
And that question is
actually secondary to another question raised in many Title VII
differ, the system may fail to produce the optimal amount (and perhaps the optimal
composition) of litigation.” Id.
47. See generally D. Marvin Jones, No Time for Trumpets: Title VII, Equality, and the
Fin de Siecle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2311 (1994) (describing racial relations during the
1950s and Title VII’s impact on the historic conflicts of that era).
48. Cf. Christine Jolls, The Role and the Functioning of Public-Interest Legal
Organizations in the Enforcement of the Employment Laws, in EMERGING LABOR MARKET
INSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 141, 146, 169 (Richard B. Freeman et
al. eds., 2005) (explaining that workers “benefit from a host of specific prohibitions
on arbitrary or inappropriate behavior by employers,” but that “[t]here is . . . a
critical and oft-emphasized distinction between the law ‘on the books’ and the law ‘in
action,’” and that this distinction is “clearly important in the employment law
context, where employees are ordinarily not in a strong position to enforce”).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000).
50. Id. Title VII’s explicit prohibition on retaliation distinguishes it from some
other civil rights statutes, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 373 (codified as amended at 20
U.S.C. § 1681 (2000)). The Supreme Court has, however, interpreted Title IX’s
prohibition on sex-based discrimination to encompass a prohibition on retaliation.
Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 173-74 (2005). Likewise, some
lower courts have interpreted § 1981 to prohibit retaliation. See, e.g., Hawkins v. 1115
Legal Serv. Care, 163 F.3d 684, 693 (2d Cir. 1998) (maintaining the view that, “in
light of the broad sweep of § 1981(b), . . . a retaliation claim may be brought under
§ 1981”); Kim v. Nash Finch Co., 123 F.3d 1046, 1059 (8th Cir. 1997) (noting, in the
context of racial discrimination, that “a claim of retaliation . . . can violate both Title
VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981”). Nonetheless, whether § 1981 prohibits retaliation
remains unsettled.
51. Between 1997 and 2006, the number of retaliation claims brought under
Title VII increased by twenty percent. EEOC, Charge Statistics FY 1999 Through FY
2006, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges.html (last visited June 16, 2007).
52. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2414 (2006) (holding
that “Title VII’s substantive [anti-discrimination] provision and its anti-retaliation
provision are not coterminous” and that “[t]he scope of the anti-retaliation provision
extends beyond workplace-related or employment-related retaliatory acts and
harm”).
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retaliation cases, that is, whether an employee’s conduct in opposing
perceived discrimination or harassment is “protected,” thereby
entitling the employee to the statute’s safeguards in the first place.
After all, if the plaintiff has neither “opposed” a practice made
unlawful by the statute nor “participated” in a proceeding under it, it
is immaterial, at least from a legal perspective, whether the employer
fired or otherwise retaliated against the plaintiff in response to that
conduct. Because of the background regime of at-will employment,
the employer may fire the employee because of the complaint, and
the employee will have no legal recourse. Thus, the anti-retaliation
provision’s protection of employees can be no broader than the
definition of what conduct it protects. It is to that issue that I turn
next.
C. Defining Protected Conduct
The anti-retaliation provision’s participation clause largely delivers
what it promises:
absolute protection from retaliation for
53
participation, of any kind, in a proceeding related to Title VII. In
contrast, it is much less clear that the opposition clause delivers what
it promises. This is because, in part, it is not clear what exactly it does
promise. While there is little dispute that the clause describes some
category of conduct broader than the provision’s “participation”
clause, the language of the provision does not make it at all clear just
how broad a category that is.
To determine whether any given plaintiff has, in fact, “opposed a
practice made unlawful by Title VII,” courts must answer not one, but
two, discrete questions. The first question is whether the form of the
complaint constitutes “opposition”; the second is whether that
opposition was directed toward “conduct made unlawful by Title
54
VII.” Although courts have been grappling with these questions
since Title VII’s enactment over thirty years ago, the Supreme Court
has yet to address the first question and only recently provided
55
limited guidance with respect to the second.
Despite the lack of Supreme Court guidance on the first question,
it seems fairly well-settled in the courts of appeals that “opposition to
53. Dorothy E. Larkin, Note, Participation Anxiety: Should Title VII’s Participation
Clause Protect Employees Participating in Internal Investigations, 33 GA. L. REV. 1181, 1191
(1999).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
55. See infra notes 65-71 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court’s
holding in Clark County School District v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 270, 271 (2001) (per
curiam), which turned on the reasonableness of the victim’s belief that the action
complained of violated Title VII).
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a Title VII violation need not rise to the level of a formal complaint to
56
Thus, for example, a plaintiff is
receive statutory protection.”
protected if she “mak[es] complaints to management, writ[es] critical
letters to customers, protest[s] against discrimination by industry or
by society in general, and express[es] support of co-workers who have
57
filed formal charges.” Some courts have also held that “opposition”
encompasses efforts to deter future acts of discrimination, as
58
illustrated in EEOC v. HBE Corp. In HBE Corp., the Eighth Circuit
concluded that the plaintiff had engaged in protected conduct when
he refused to fire another employee because he believed that the
59
employer’s decision was racially motivated.
The court explained
that “[o]pposition must be based on a reasonable belief that an
employer has engaged in discriminatory conduct, and it can include
60
refusal to implement a discriminatory policy.”
In EEOC v. Navy
61
Federal Credit Union, the plaintiff objected to losing supervisory
authority over an employee and refused to sign what she viewed as a
misleading evaluation of that employee because she believed it was all
part of a scheme to terminate the employee in retaliation for her
62
allegations of discrimination.
The Fourth Circuit held that this
conduct was protected, noting that “protected oppositional activities
may include ‘staging informal protests and voicing one’s own
opinions in order to bring attention to an employer’s discriminatory
63
activities.’”
In answering the second question, whether a plaintiff’s opposition
was directed toward conduct made unlawful under Title VII, most
courts have held that “an employment practice need not actually
violate Title VII for the protected activities element of a retaliation
claim to be satisfied. The plaintiff is only required to have had a
good faith, reasonable belief that [s]he was opposing an employment
64
practice made unlawful by Title VII.” Thus, a plaintiff may be able
56. Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 566 (2d Cir. 2000).
57. Sumner v. United States Postal Serv., 899 F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir. 1990).
58. 135 F.3d 543 (8th Cir. 1998).
59. Id. at 557.
60. Id. at 554.
61. 424 F.3d 397 (4th Cir. 2005).
62. Id. at 406.
63. Id. (quoting Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 259 (4th
Cir. 1998)).
64. McHenemy v. City of Rochester, 241 F.3d 279, 285 (2d Cir. 2001); see Trent v.
Valley Elec. Ass’n, 41 F.3d 524, 526 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[A] plaintiff does not need to
prove that the employment practice at issue was in fact unlawful under Title VII.”);
Alexander v. Gerhardt Enters., 40 F.3d 187, 195 (7th Cir. 1994) (“The conduct a
plaintiff opposes need not actually violate Title VII.”) (citation omitted); Sisco v. J.S.
Alberici Constr. Co., 655 F.2d 146, 150 (8th Cir. 1981) (“[A]s long as the employee
had a reasonable belief that what was being opposed constituted discrimination
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to prevail on a retaliation claim even if a jury ultimately determines
that the activity about which the plaintiff complained was not
discrimination. Although it might initially seem counter-intuitive
that an employer that never engaged in unlawful discrimination
would nonetheless retaliate against an employee, it is actually
unsurprising that an employer who did not initially discriminate
might nonetheless respond negatively to an employee complaint. In
fact, in the case in which an employer did nothing wrong, the
employer might be that much more likely to respond negatively to an
employee complaint because the employer might view the complaint
as frivolous and the employee who made it as a troublemaker.
Responding to such complaints requires time and energy on the part
of the employer, and an employer who believes that a particular
employee is likely to make a practice of filing frivolous complaints
may deem it in his best interest to sever the employment relationship.
While the courts of appeals seem to have largely settled on this
standard, differences are starting to emerge in how that standard is
applied. This result is hardly surprising, given that the standard
actually says little about what a plaintiff must show in practice to
establish that her conduct is protected. What does it mean, one
might well wonder, for an individual’s belief to be reasonable?
Because the standard is, in part, objective, it makes sense that there
must be some baseline against which the plaintiff’s beliefs are
measured, but what is the appropriate standard? Should it be the
governing case law, or the general public’s views, or some other
alternative altogether?
What if the plaintiff could not have
reasonably believed that the practice she was opposing was unlawful,
whatever that means, but the conduct about which she complained
would have been unlawful had it continued into the future?
The answers two courts of appeals recently provided to these
questions show how easily the anti-retaliation provision’s protections
can be undermined when plaintiffs must establish the reasonableness
of their beliefs to merit protection. Just as troubling as these answers
is what they reveal more generally about the “reasonableness”
standard, that is, the significant variation in application that it
permits. This variation is particularly problematic in the case of the

under Title VII, the claim of retaliation does not hinge upon a showing that the
employer was in fact in violation of Title VII.”) (internal citation & quotation marks
omitted); Payne v. McLemore’s Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1137 (5th
Cir. Unit A Sept. 1981) (agreeing that “it was sufficient to establish a prima facie case
if [the plaintiff] had a reasonable belief that defendant had engaged in the unlawful
employment practices”).
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anti-retaliation provision because its success depends, in large
measure, on the consistency and uniformity of its application.
D. The Questions: Applying “Reasonableness”
These recent courts of appeals decisions raise two discrete, albeit
related, questions about what it means for a plaintiff to have a “good
faith, reasonable belief” that a given employment practice is unlawful.
Both of these questions lurked in the background of the single case
in which the Supreme Court confronted the question of what it
means for a plaintiff to oppose conduct made unlawful by Title VII.
65
In Clark County School District v. Breeden, the female plaintiff’s job
66
required her to review applicants’ psychological examinations. One
of the examinations reported that the applicant had once told a coworker, “I hear making love to you is like making love to the Grand
67
Canyon.” At a meeting, the plaintiff’s supervisor read the comment
aloud, looked at the plaintiff and stated, “I don’t know what that
means,” at which point a co-worker said, “Well, I’ll tell you later,” and
68
both men chuckled. The Court assumed, without deciding, that
those comments did not need to be unlawful for the plaintiff’s
complaint about them to be protected under Title VII’s anti69
retaliation provision. The Court nonetheless concluded that the
plaintiff’s claim failed because “[n]o reasonable person could have
believed that the single incident [about which the plaintiff
70
complained] violated Title VII’s standard,” which provides that
harassment is not actionable unless it is “sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and
71
create an abusive working environment.”
The result in that particular case is unsurprising. The sexually
explicit comment was in a report the plaintiff was required to review
as part of her job; the co-workers’ response was relatively innocuous;
72
and none of the comments were directed at the plaintiff. Yet two
65. 532 U.S. 268 (2001) (per curiam).
66. Id. at 269, 271.
67. Id. at 269.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 270.
70. Id. at 271.
71. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (internal quotation
marks and alteration omitted). Katherine Franke has noted that Meritor Savings Bank
adopted much of MacKinnon’s perspective “[s]even years after MacKinnon made the
argument for understanding sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination.”
Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691, 704
(1997).
72. Clark County, 532 U.S. at 271.
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important questions were left unasked, not to mention unanswered,
by the Supreme Court’s decision in Clark County. While these
questions have yet to receive sustained treatment in the courts of
appeals, the early answers suggest that the courts may be poised to
limit workers’ ability to sue when they are retaliated against for
claiming that they have been the victims of discrimination.
In Clark County, it seems indisputable that no reasonable juror
could have concluded that the conduct at issue constituted “sexual
harassment.” But does that necessarily render unreasonable the
plaintiff’s belief that it was unlawful? It is just that position that the
73
D.C. Circuit seems to have implicitly taken in George v. Leavitt.
There, the plaintiff, an African-American woman from Trinidad and
Tobago named Diane George, complained that her co-workers
made insulting and demeaning statements to her. On different
occasions, she was told by three separate employees to “go back to
Trinidad” or to “go back to where [she] came from.” On these and
other occasions, her co-workers shouted at her, told her that she
74
should never have been hired, and told her to “shut up.”

Shortly after she complained about these incidents to her
supervisor, the supervisor met with the rest of the staff and told them
75
to keep their distance from the plaintiff. The plaintiff eventually
sued under Title VII, “claiming unlawful discrimination based on
race, sex, and national origin; a hostile work environment; and
76
retaliation.”
After noting that “offhand teasing” cannot create a hostile work
environment, the court concluded that the district court
correctly recognized that the facts alleged by George, even if true,
would not permit a reasonable jury to conclude that George’s
workplace was “permeated with discriminatory intimidation,
ridicule, and insult that [was] sufficiently severe or pervasive to
alter the conditions of [her] employment and create an abusive
working environment.” At best, they constitute exactly the sort of
“isolated incidents” that the Supreme Court has held cannot form
77
the basis for a Title VII violation.

73. 407 F.3d 405 (D.C. Cir. 2005). This holding would not eviscerate the wellestablished rule that a plaintiff can prevail on her anti-retaliation claim even if the
conduct about which she complained was not unlawful. In any given case, a jury
could find for the plaintiff on her retaliation claim and find that the complainedabout conduct was not unlawful. That does not mean that a reasonable jury could not
have found otherwise as to the discrimination claim.
74. Id. at 407-08 (alteration in original).
75. Id. at 408.
76. Id. at 410.
77. Id. at 416-17 (alteration in original).

GOROD.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC

2007]

8/6/2007 10:15:25 PM

REJECTING “REASONABLENESS”

1487

With no additional analysis, the court rejected the plaintiff’s
retaliation claim. It concluded that “the incidents of which George
complained could not reasonably be thought to constitute an abusive
78
working environment in violation of Title VII.”
Thus, with no
discussion, the D.C. Circuit seems to have assumed that the
appropriate benchmark for assessing the reasonableness of the
plaintiff’s belief was the definition of “sexual harassment” established
in the case law. It appears to have assumed, as well, that the only
conduct it should consider was the past harassing conduct, and that it
need not consider whether a continuation of that conduct would
79
have created a hostile work environment.
The Fourth Circuit is the only circuit to give this latter question
80
sustained attention. In Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corporation, the
plaintiff alleged that he was in a room with a co-worker who was
watching television when the news reported that John Allen
Muhammed and Lee Boyd Malvo, the individuals responsible for the
81
82
2002 D.C. area sniper attacks, had been captured. In response to
that report, the co-worker exclaimed that “[t]hey should put those
two black monkeys in a cage with a bunch of black apes and let the
83
apes f—k them.” Following this incident, the plaintiff complained
78. Id. at 417.
79. The Second Circuit has suggested that it might adopt a similar approach,
although it has not yet definitively reached the issue. In Reed v. A.W. Lawrence & Co.,
the plaintiff complained about, among other things, the fact that a co-worker, in a
phone conversation, had begun a sentence by saying “if you think my pecker is
getting in the way,” at which point she hung up the phone. 95 F.3d 1170, 1175 (2d
Cir. 1996). The court noted that the “plaintiff likely would not have passed the
‘good faith reasonable[ness]’ test . . . if the only evidence offered at trial had been
[the co-worker’s] isolated comment,” but it declined to reach that issue because it
found that “a review of the record reveals that the evidence presented to the jury
included more than this one remark.” Id. at 1179 (alteration in original) (footnote
omitted). The Seventh Circuit, by contrast, has suggested that a single isolated
comment can make conduct protected under Title VII. In Alexander v. Gerhardt
Enterprises, the Seventh Circuit held that the district court’s conclusion that the
plaintiff reasonably believed that she was opposing a practice made unlawful under
Title VII when she complained about the statement “if a [n-word] can do it, anybody
can do it” was not clearly erroneous. 40 F.3d 187, 190, 195-96 (7th Cir. 1994).
There, the court did not resolve whether that statement created a hostile work
environment because plaintiff did not bring such a claim. Id. at 190. It is worth
noting, however, that the Seventh Circuit treated this as a finding of fact, rather than
a question of law, and thus evaluated the district court’s conclusion under a very
deferential standard of review. Id. at 195.
80. No. 05-1485 (4th Cir. May 12, 2006), vacated and reh’g granted, No. 05-1485,
2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 16794 (4th Cir. July 5, 2006), affirmed on reh’g, 458 F.3d 332
(4th Cir. 2006), reh’g en banc denied, 467 F.3d 378, 379 (4th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127
S. Ct. 2036 (2007).
81. James Dao & Lisa A. Bacon, Young Suspect in Sniper Case Becomes Central Figure
in a Trial That Is Not His, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2003, at A12.
82. Jordan, No. 05-1485, slip op. at 4.
83. Id.
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to a number of his supervisors, claiming that he was offended and
that he did not believe his co-worker should “speak so callously in the
84
During the month following his complaint, the plaintiff
office.”
alleged that his shift was changed; he was given additional work
assignments; a supervisor made a derogatory remark to him; and he
was ultimately fired because “he was ‘disruptive,’ his position ‘had
come to an end,’ and IBM employees and officials ‘don’t like you and
85
you don’t like them.’”
The Fourth Circuit “readily conclude[d] that [the plaintiff] was
not” complaining of an actual hostile work environment because the
isolated comment “was not directed at any fellow employee[,]” and
86
was a “singular and isolated exclamation.”
Therefore it did not
87
“alter[] the terms and conditions of his employment.” The Fourth
Circuit also held that it was not sufficient that “Jordan reasonably
concluded that the remark was inappropriate and should not have
been made,” because he failed to show that he had “a reasonably
objective belief that [the opposed conduct would] continue or
88
The court explained that “an employee
[would] be repeated.”
seeking protection from retaliation must have had an objectively
reasonable belief in light of all the circumstances that a Title VII
violation had happened or was in progress. Thus, we cannot simply
assume, without more, that the opposed conduct will continue or will
89
be repeated unabated.”
Judge King dissented, disagreeing with his colleagues that “an
employee lacks Title VII protection for reporting racially charged
conduct, unless he has ‘a reasonably objective belief that it will
90
continue or will be repeated.’” He instead took the position that
“employees are protected under Title VII from employer retaliation if
they oppose conduct that, if repeated, could amount to a hostile work
environment . . . even absent an independent basis for believing the
91
conduct might be repeated.” Judge King expressed concern that the
majority’s decision would result in employees
fac[ing] . . . a “Catch-22.” They may report such conduct to their
employer at their peril (as Jordan did), or they may remain quiet
and work in a racially hostile and degrading work environment

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 8, 9.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 9, 10.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 23 (King, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
Id. at 24.
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with no legal recourse beyond resignation. Of course, the essential
92
purpose of Title VII is to avoid such situations.
93

Moreover, as discussed in greater detail below, if the employee
fails to report the harassing behavior, the employer may have an
affirmative defense to liability should the employee eventually sue
94
after the behavior becomes too much to bear.
This “Catch-22”
scenario that Judge King predicted reflects a more general problem
with the “reasonableness” requirement, namely, that individuals
cannot know when their complaints will be protected and when they
will not.
II. CHANGING THE PARADIGM: REJECTING “REASONABLENESS”
While retaliation claims can be brought—and often are brought—
in the context of many different kinds of discrimination claims, they
often present particularly challenging questions in the context of
sexual harassment.
Consider, for example, the following
hypothetical. Rosa Smith is talking with one of her co-workers when
another co-worker comes up behind her, pinches her, and says with a
sneer, “I bet you enjoyed that, honey.” Although it is the first time
she has ever experienced that kind of treatment at work, she is both
embarrassed and offended by the co-worker’s conduct, and she
reports the incident to her supervisor. She describes the incident,
92. Id. at 25. Following its decision, the court granted the plaintiff’s petition for
rehearing and vacated its original decision. Jordan v. Alternative Res. Corp., No. 051485, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 16794 (4th Cir. July 5, 2006). On rehearing, the court
affirmed its earlier decision. Jordan v. Alternative Res. Corp., 458 F.3d 332 (4th Cir.
2006). On plaintiff’s request for the court to rehear the case en banc, five judges
voted to rehear the case, and five voted not to do so. Because a majority of the full
court was required to go en banc, the plaintiff’s request was denied. Jordan v.
Alternative Res. Corp., 467 F.3d 378, 379 (4th Cir. 2006). Judge King again dissented
from that decision. This time, he was joined by four other judges of the court. He
also “urge[d] the Supreme Court to accord serious consideration to any petition for
certiorari that Jordan may file.” Id. at 383 (King, J., dissenting).
93. See infra Part III.A (discussing the Supreme Court’s requirement of early
reporting in the context of employer liability).
94. See Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace
Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1201 (1989) (“In deciding whether a defendant’s
behavior created an environment that was ‘intimidating, hostile, or offensive,’ courts
often dismiss the plaintiff’s perceptions. Some courts discount the anguish reported
by the plaintiff, because of factors such as timorousness or delay in reporting the
harassing conduct.”) (footnote omitted); Anne Lawton, Operating in an Empirical
Vacuum: The Ellerth and Faragher Affirmative Defense, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197,
243 (2004) [hereinafter Lawton, Operating] (“[C]ourts engage in fact-finding on
motions for summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law, concluding that
any ‘delay’ in reporting equals an unreasonable failure on the part of the plaintiff to
use her employer’s reporting machinery.”). Lawton notes the oddity of this
response, given that empirical research shows that while “formal reporting of sexual
harassment is an uncommon occurrence, retaliation in response to such complaints
is not.” Lawton, Operating, supra, at 243, 254-55.
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explains how it made her feel, and asks the employer to try to prevent
similar incidents from occurring in the future. The employer
promptly fires Rosa for complaining about her co-worker’s conduct
and does nothing to the harassing co-worker.
A. The Problem
Viewed against the background of the case law on sexual
harassment, this hypothetical hardly presents a unique situation. To
the contrary, it is merely the beginning of the scenarios described in
many hostile work environment cases, and the iterative nature of
these claims makes clear why the questions raised by the George and
Jordan cases are so important.
In the hostile work environment context, the Supreme Court has
cautioned that not every offensive utterance or epithet is actionable
95
under Title VII; rather, “[f]or sexual harassment to be actionable, it
must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the
96
victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.”
In determining whether conduct is “severe or pervasive,” the
Supreme Court has instructed the lower courts to consider “all the
circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory
conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it
97
unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.”
Thus, the Court has tried to provide some guidance as to when
conduct is unlawful, but that guidance hardly provides definitive
answers as to how a court will rule in any given case.
To the contrary, all this guidance makes clear is that there is a line
between conduct that is merely “offensive” and conduct that is
98
“abusive,” and that line is sometimes fine.
Indeed, one
95. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (noting that Title VII “takes
a middle path between making actionable any conduct that is merely offensive and
requiring the conduct to cause a tangible psychological injury”).
96. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (internal quotation
marks and alteration omitted).
97. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787-88 (1998) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
98. As one commentator has noted, “[b]ecause aggression is so pervasive and
integral to social life, yet simultaneously ambiguous and subtle, it is—not
surprisingly—difficult to create a working legal definition of harassment, i.e., of that
particular category of severe and repetitive emotional abuse that a humane legal
system might want to prohibit.” Brady Coleman, Pragmatism’s Insult: The Growing
Interdisciplinary Challenge to American Harassment Jurisprudence, 8 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y
J. 239, 242 (2004). Even Justice Scalia has noted that the word “‘[a]busive’ (or
‘hostile,’ which in this context I take to mean the same thing) does not seem to me a
very clear standard,” and the level of “clarity is [not] at all increased by adding the
adverb ‘objectively’ or by appealing to a ‘reasonable person[’s]’ notion of what the
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commentator has noted that “[w]hile judges and scholars try to
define and explain hostile environment sexual harassment, its
meaning—a nimble Houdini of legal doctrine—continues to escape
99
their chains.” If judges and scholars cannot arrive at a satisfactory
definition of sexual harassment, how are workers supposed to
anticipate how the courts will define it in any given case? And if
courts struggle to determine where exactly that line falls in individual
cases, is it any surprise that employees, unfamiliar with the law, may
wonder as well?
Moreover, in some cases, the difficulty is not in knowing where the
line falls, but in knowing that the line exists at all. The prevalence of
sexual harassment, and the burgeoning efforts of employers to
ameliorate it, means there is much popular writing aimed at helping
100
women to recognize what behavior is sexual harassment.
Unfortunately, that advice is not always perfect. Many employers now
have sexual harassment materials that warn employees against any
101
teasing or flirting behavior in the workplace. While the fineness of
the line between the legal and the illegal makes it sensible for such
material to warn against any potentially inappropriate behavior, it
may cause individuals to believe that any such conduct is not only
inappropriate, but also illegal. Thus, employees like the one in the
hypothetical will be tempted to report such behavior the very first
time it occurs, despite the fact that an isolated incident of such

vague word means.” Harris, 510 U.S. at 24 (Scalia, J., concurring) (final alteration in
original).
99. Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV. 445,
448 (1997); see id. at 449 (“Because courts have been unable to enunciate a clear
standard, juries remain unguided, as do men and women in the workplace.”);
Suzanne Sangree, Title VII Prohibitions Against Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment
and the First Amendment: No Collision in Sight, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 461, 528-29 (1995)
(noting that some have argued that “employers do not know what exactly Title VII
prohibits as sexual harassment” because “the definition of hostile environment sex
harassment is entirely context specific, takes into account multiple factors [and] does
not define how much of any one factor is required”).
100. See infra note 101 (describing some common literature provided to women
regarding sexual harassment in the workplace).
101. One book on sexual harassment explains that “[a]ny unwanted or
inappropriate sexual attention is sexual harassment. That includes touching, looks,
comments, or gestures.” ELIZABETH BOUCHARD, EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW
ABOUT SEXUAL HARASSMENT 21 (rev. ed. 1994). Although the book also noted that
“[s]exual harassment almost always happens over and over,” and “[t]he offensive
gesture, invitation or action is repeated again and again,” these statements appeared
to be descriptive, and not definitional. Id. at 23. The book encourages women to
“[j]ust say no to any advances, right from the start,” id. at 38, and explains that “the
worst thing you can do is to ignore harassment.” Id. at 41. The book encourages
women to write a letter to the harasser, id. at 43, and, if that does not work, to “go to
someone in charge and report what’s going on.” Id. at 44.
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conduct is only rarely sufficient to establish a “hostile work
102
environment.”
After all, when an employee in Rosa’s situation feels that she has
been the victim of discrimination, her belief is most often intuitive; it
is the product not of a studious examination of the Federal
Reporters, but rather the product of popular understanding. The
D.C. Circuit’s approach—what I call “the reasonable juror
standard”—assumes the contrary, however, because when jurors
determine whether conduct is unlawful under Title VII, they are
103
doing so after an instruction in the appropriate law to apply. The
D.C. Circuit’s approach, although appealing in its simplicity, does not
identify this premise on which it implicitly rests, that is, that the
benchmark for determining the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s
belief should be what the law is, rather than what the general public
believes it to be. In other words, the D.C. Circuit’s approach
effectively holds plaintiffs responsible for knowing the current state
104
of the case law on “hostile work environment.”

102. Although a single incident can be sufficient to constitute sexual harassment,
it must be sufficiently severe to alter the conditions of plaintiff’s employment. See,
e.g., Howley v. Town of Stratford, 217 F.3d 141, 154 (2d Cir. 2000) (“Although
Holdsworth made his obscene comments only on one occasion, the evidence is that
he did so at length, loudly, and in a large group in which Howley was the only female
and many of the men were her subordinates. And his verbal assault included charges
that Howley had gained her office of lieutenant only by performing fellatio.”).
103. See generally Peter Tiersma, The Rocky Road to Legal Reform: Improving the
Language of Jury Instructions, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1081 (2001) (discussing the need for
clearer jury instructions so that juries will comprehend the relevant law and make
better decisions).
104. The D.C. Circuit is not the only court to take this view. One commentator
has noted that “the [Supreme] Court’s lengthy recitation of sexual harassment
caselaw before dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint as ‘unreasonable’ [in Clark
County] belies any notion that a layperson’s perception of unlawfulness of the
challenged conduct will shield opposition activity from employer retaliation.”
Marshall, supra note 13, at 93.
The Eleventh Circuit, for example, has rejected the argument that:
[W]hen judging the reasonableness of [the plaintiffs’] belief, we should not
charge them with substantive knowledge of the law as set forth in . . . the
cases cited above. We reject the plaintiffs’ argument because it would
eviscerate the objective component of our reasonableness inquiry. If the
plaintiffs are free to disclaim knowledge of the substantive law, the
reasonableness inquiry becomes no more than speculation regarding their
subjective knowledge.
Harper v. Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1388 n.2 (11th Cir. 1998)
(citation omitted).
The difference between the D.C. Circuit and Eleventh Circuit’s approaches is that
the latter court suggested that while it must hold plaintiffs responsible for knowing
the state of the law in an area, the fact that they sometimes make mistakes in their
understanding of that law will not automatically render their belief unreasonable. In
Harper, the court concluded that the plaintiff could not have believed that
Blockbuster’s policy on hair lengths was unlawful because that claim “[was] belied by
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In some contexts, such an approach might present little cause for
concern. For example, most people would know that an employer’s
decision to fire an individual because of her race violates the law,
even if they could not name the precise law that it violates. And,
indeed, most people would also correctly assume that if an
employee’s supervisor repeatedly told her he wanted to have sex with
her and touched her inappropriately, that conduct would be
unlawful. However, as discussed above, “hostile work environment”
claims are unique in that by “[t]heir very nature [they] involve[]
105
repeated conduct,” and their beginnings may be inappropriate, but
not unlawful. Thus, this context seems to threaten to produce a high
number of false positives, or situations in which members of the
general public might assume that conduct was unlawful even though
106
the conduct clearly is not unlawful under well-established case law.
One commentator has noted that
holding laypersons to a standard that requires not only familiarity
with caselaw, but the ability to distinguish precedent based on the
facts of a given case before their opposition to an employer’s policy
is protected under Title VII . . . undeniably has the potential to
expose many individual complainants to employer retaliation
107
without redress.

the unanimity with which the courts have declared grooming policies like
Blockbuster’s non-discriminatory.” Id. at 1388.
105. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115 (2002).
106. As the Fourth Circuit has explained, “[i]f a witness in a Title VII proceeding
were secure from retaliation only when her testimony met some slippery
reasonableness standard, she would surely be less than forthcoming.” Glover v. S.C.
Law Enforcement Div., 170 F.3d 411, 414 (4th Cir. 1999). There is no reason to
think that this “slippery” standard will not also make individuals more hesitant to
oppose practices made unlawful under Title VII.
107. Marshall, supra note 13, at 91. Marshall also notes that when the
[u]nlawfulness of the challenged practice [is] “measured against existing
substantive law” . . . an employee engaging in opposition conduct runs a
significant risk that his actions will fall outside the range of “protected
activity” under the opposition clause, since the courts applying that standard
have been unmoved by arguments regarding the reasonableness of the
average layperson’s belief as to what might constitute unlawful employment
discrimination.
Id. at 89-90 (footnote omitted). Similarly, another commentator writes:
Sexual harassment often partakes, at least to some degree, of “I-know-itwhen-I-see-it-ness.” The average person can likely distinguish between a
tentative, but unwanted, sexual overture or a clumsy compliment on the one
hand and a hostile and demeaning series of sexual threats and mockeries on
the other. Nonetheless, to the extent that talk of sexual harassment tends
inevitably to generate some hostile comments and questions, some of the
ridicule and hostility may arise out of a deeply felt sense that sexual
harassment doctrine is filled with vagueness and contradictions.
Rosa Ehrenreich, Dignity and Discrimination: Toward a Pluralistic Understanding of
Workplace Harassment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1, 6-7 (1999) (footnote omitted).
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There is considerable reason to think that this theoretical
possibility is likely a reality. Although commentators have noted the
108
ability of legal norms to shape social norms and vice versa,
commentators have also noted that “popular understandings are not
109
necessarily the same as the technical legal definition.”
Moreover,
employees’ understandings of what constitutes harassment will be
110
shaped in large part by media accounts.
Thus, to the extent that
the media paints a broader picture of sexual harassment, the general
111
While this phenomenon
public may begin to accept that belief.
might arguably affect jurors as well, thus contributing to an increase
in plaintiff success at trial, that matters only if cases actually make it to
112
trial. Many do not.
And, again, a jury decides a case only after
having been instructed in the law, generally with a warning from the
judge that jurors must follow his instructions and not their own
113
preconceived notions of what the law is or should be.
While the possibility that popular understandings of legal concepts
will not map exactly onto their precise legal definition undoubtedly

108. See Krieger, supra note 3, at 478 (“[F]ormal law and informal social norms are
not mutually independent. Social norms both shape and are shaped by formal
law.”).
109. Jack Balkin, The Proliferation of Legal Truth, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 9
(2003).
110. See Nielsen & Beim, supra note 39, at 257-58 (“Americans’ beliefs and
expectations are shaped, in large part, by media portrayals. If the media paints a
distorted picture, Americans come to have a distorted view.”).
111. According to Nielsen and Beim:
Ordinary workers who come to think of the anti-discrimination law system as
a windfall for plaintiffs may come to have unrealistic expectations about what
constitutes illegal workplace discrimination and their likelihood of winning
(should they pursue a claim), as well as the remedy they are likely to obtain
should they prevail. These unrealistic expectations may be one of the many
factors fueling increased claiming behavior in the last decade.
Id. at 260. Nielsen and Beim also note that notwithstanding this increase in claims,
“it is still the case that the vast majority of employees who think they have been
discriminated against in the workplace do not pursue a formal complaint either
within the organization or with the appropriate state or federal agency.” Id. at 261.
112. See, e.g., Symposium, Civil Rights Act, supra note 34, at 794 (“Summary
judgment is routinely affirmed by the Fourth Circuit in cases where there are big
factual issues.”).
113. For example, one jury instruction reads:
My duty at this point is to instruct you as to the law. It is your duty to accept
these instructions of law and apply them to the facts as you determine
them . . . . On these legal matters, you must take the law as I give it to
you. . . . You should not, any of you, be concerned about the wisdom of any
rule that I state. Regardless of any opinion that you may have as to what the
law may be—or ought to be—it would violate your sworn duty to base a
verdict upon any other view of the law than that which I give you.
4 LEONARD B. SAND ET AL., MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS ¶ 71.02 (Release No.
50A 2007).
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114

exists throughout the law, the danger is even more pronounced in
the context of hostile work environment claims involving sexual
harassment. As noted above, this is in part because courts often take
meaningfully different approaches in deciding what constitutes
115
sexual harassment.
If the courts cannot agree, how are individual
citizens supposed to know? But there is an additional reason why this
approach presents cause for special concern in the sexual harassment
context. Studies have shown that there is “a gender gap in the
definition of sexual harassment. In general, women have a broader,
more inclusive definition of sexual harassment and are more likely
116
than men to view mild social sexual behavior as sexual harassment.”
114. In considering whether to hold individuals responsible for knowing the
relevant law, it is interesting to consider the very different field of qualified
immunity. The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials from
suits for damages unless their actions violate clearly-established rights of which an
objectively reasonable official would have known. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
635, 638 (1987). In this context, courts have recognized that “it is inevitable that law
enforcement officials will in some cases ‘reasonably but mistakenly’” believe that
their actions are lawful. Id. at 641. Thus, “[t]he qualified immunity standard ‘gives
ample room for mistaken judgments’ by protecting ‘all but the plainly incompetent
or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991).
Law enforcement officials are accorded this room to make mistakes because “the
public interest requires that public officials be able to carry out their discretionary
duties and act decisively without the intimidation that would result if good-faith
errors in judgment were later to subject them to liability for damages.” Laverne v.
Corning, 522 F.2d 1144, 1149 (2d Cir. 1975). If we recognize that even law
enforcement officials, who can reasonably be expected to know the law, will
sometimes make mistakes, it makes sense to recognize that lay people will often make
mistakes as well. Some courts have accorded plaintiffs this same breathing room in
the context of hostile work environment claims. See Berg v. La Crosse Cooler Co.,
612 F.2d 1041, 1045 (7th Cir. 1980) (“The plaintiff here was an educated and
informed layperson who should not be burdened with the sometimes impossible task
of correctly anticipating how the Supreme Court may interpret a particular statute.”).
115. See supra Part II.A (discussing the difficulties of adequately defining sexual
harassment).
116. Barbara A. Gutek et al., The Utility of the Reasonable Woman Legal Standard in
Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Cases: A Multimethod, Multistudy Examination, 5
PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 596, 607 (1999); see Abrams, supra note 94, at 1202 (“[M]en
regard conduct, ranging from sexual demands to sexual innuendo, differently than
women do.”); Bernstein, supra note 99, at 465-66 (“In positing a genderless victim of
sexual harassment, the reasonable person standard pushes under the rug an
embarrassing mass of evidence indicating that gender affects the way men and
women perceive sexual behavior in the workplace. A reasonable person standard
implicitly denies that women and men are likely to react differently to sexual
invitations, innuendo, teasing, or displays in the workplace. Yet empirical findings
show that men are relatively likely to feel flattered or amused, whereas women are
relatively likely to feel frightened or insulted, by sex-related behavior or displays at
work.”) (footnote omitted); Nielsen & Beim, supra note 39, at 241 (“Research on the
prevalence of discrimination in the workplace shows a striking disjuncture between
the perceptions of white women and people of color in the workplace and those of
their white [male] colleagues and supervisors.”); cf. Terry Smith, Everyday Indignities:
Race, Retaliation, and the Promise of Title VII, 34 COLUM. HUMAN RTS. L. REV. 529, 565-66
(2003) (“Minorities are considerably more likely to perceive an event as
discriminatory than are whites.”). While some commentators have urged the
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These studies not only support the idea that popular understandings
of sexual harassment often differ from the legal definition, but they
also suggest an additional reason not to employ the “reasonable
juror” standard in determining what conduct is protected under Title
VII. After all, if women tend to have a broader view of what conduct
constitutes sexual harassment, then women, one of the groups Title
VII was intended to protect, will be most likely to get caught in the
gap between what members of the public may view as reasonable and
117
what the law does.
Indeed, as a result of the “reasonable juror” standard, women who
report early will be unprotected from retaliation, and other women
may wait to report harassing behavior until it occurs repeatedly and
they feel comfortable that the conduct is such that a “reasonable
juror” could find that it is unlawful under Title VII. The Fourth
Circuit’s approach—what I call the “repeated conduct” standard—
suffers from the same problem. It requires the plaintiff to establish
that it was reasonable for her to believe that the conduct would be
118
repeated.
In most cases, a woman cannot know whether the
conduct will likely be repeated; thus, this standard effectively forces
her to wait to complain until the co-worker repeats his actions if she
wants her complaint to be protected. Thus, both the “reasonable
juror” and the “repeated conduct” standards deter reporting, and just
as importantly, they deter early reporting. As a result, they threaten
to undercut many of the fundamental purposes underlying Title VII.

adoption of a reasonable woman standard to address this concern, such a standard is
not without its own problems. See Bernstein, supra note 99, at 471-77 (detailing the
various arguments against a reasonable woman standard, and the difficulties in
ascertaining what that standard means and how it can and should be applied).
117. Admittedly, one could adopt the position that even if members of the general
public do not know the law in this area, they should know it, and adopting the
“reasonable juror” standard will encourage acquisition of that knowledge. But this
may be an area in which widespread knowledge does more harm than good. Do we
want individuals who might consider harassing their co-workers to know that isolated
comments will not subject them to liability? Will that help to achieve Title VII’s
objectives? Even if we did want to encourage knowledge of the law, is there any
reason to think that we should not allow for reasonable mistakes on the part of
individuals who complain about discrimination? And, perhaps most significantly,
there is little reason to place the burden of acquiring knowledge on employees when
we could place on employers the burden of educating their employees.
118. Jordan v. Alternative Res. Corp., No. 05-1485, slip op. at 10 (4th Cir. May 12,
2006), vacated and reh’g granted, No. 05-1485, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 16794 (4th Cir.
July 5, 2006), affirmed on reh’g, 458 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2006), reh’g en banc denied, 467
F.3d 378, 379 (4th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2036 (2007).
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B. The Solution
What then to do about it? How can courts provide sufficient
protection to employees without intruding on the legitimate
decisionmaking prerogatives of employers? While one solution might
be to adopt a “reasonable woman” standard, it is questionable how
effective such a solution would be. A “reasonable woman” standard is
hardly more concrete than any other “reasonableness” standard, and
it is unlikely that courts will find it any easier to apply. Moreover,
according to one commentator:
Because most judges are men, who have experienced the
traditional forms of male socialization, their instinctive reaction is
to accept the perspective of the employer. . . . [A] characteristically
“male” view, which depicts sexual taunts, inquiries or magazines as
a comparatively harmless amusement, or as the treatment women
should expect when they push their way into the workplace,
119
pervades many recent opinions.

Thus, it may be difficult for these male judges to understand what
120
would be acceptable to the hypothetical “reasonable woman.” As a
result, while such an approach might produce greater sensitivity to
the problem, it is not at all clear that it would actually produce
tangible results that would bring us closer to solving it.
Surprisingly, the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Jordan came close to
providing an answer, at least a partial one. One of the situations in
which an individual is most likely to erroneously believe that she is
the victim of sexual harassment, even though existing case law does
not define the conduct she has experienced as such, is when she has
experienced an isolated incident of relatively subtle harassment or
sexual teasing. Yet if there were repeated instances of such conduct,
it is likely that they could rise to a level that would be “severe or
pervasive” enough to alter the terms and conditions of the plaintiff’s
employment and thus constitute a “hostile work environment.” In
other words, if the Fourth Circuit had simply held that a plaintiff’s
belief is reasonable if she experiences conduct that, if repeated,
would constitute sexual harassment, it would have gone far toward
creating a standard that can be applied with relative ease and would
allow most plaintiffs to report harassing conduct early without fear
119. Abrams, supra note 94, at 1203.
120. Although juries will presumably be more gender-balanced than the federal
judiciary, many cases will never make it to a jury. In George v. Leavitt, for example, the
district court dismissed the plaintiff’s retaliation claim on summary judgment, and
the D.C. Circuit affirmed because “the incidents of which [the plaintiff] complained
could not reasonably be thought to constitute an abusive working environment in
violation of Title VII.” 407 F.3d 405, 417 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
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that they will fall outside of the anti-retaliation provision’s protective
scope. However, what the Fourth Circuit gave with one hand, it took
away with the other. Where the Fourth Circuit went astray was in
requiring that plaintiffs be able to show that it was reasonable for
121
them to believe that such conduct would recur.
In many cases, if
not most, plaintiffs will have no way of knowing whether such
conduct is likely to be repeated. And leaving to chance whether they
will be subjected to future unwanted, embarrassing advances is
neither a desirable outcome, nor one that will advance the goals of
Title VII.
Rather than placing the burden on plaintiffs, the Fourth Circuit
could have established an affirmative defense that would be available
to defendants that could show that it was unreasonable for the
plaintiff in a given case to believe that the conduct was likely to recur.
In Jordan, the court noted that the racial epithets, as offensive and
inappropriate as they were, constituted a heated, emotional response
to a news report; in the lengthy time in which the plaintiff had
122
worked there, they had not previously occurred.
If the Fourth
Circuit had established an affirmative defense, the defendant could
have made these arguments to a jury and, had the jury accepted
them, there would have been no liability. While an affirmative
defense does not spare a defendant the costs of litigation, it
nonetheless represents a reasonable compromise between the need
to provide broad protection to employees without unduly impeding
on the personnel decisions of employers. And, perhaps even more
importantly, it represents a way to serve the goals of Title VII in the
process of striking that compromise. After all, even if the plaintiff
loses at trial, getting to trial is itself significant because it helps to
facilitate greater conversation about what types of workplace conduct
are appropriate and allows those who believe they have been
victimized to speak out in a public forum.
The question then is whether such an approach goes far enough.
Could situations arise in which an employee believes that an isolated
incident is sexual harassment even though it would not, even if
repeated, meet the requirements of sexual harassment law?
Unfortunately, examples abound. For example, a woman might
believe it is harassment if a co-worker repeatedly asks her out on a
date, but some courts—although by no means all—have suggested
that romantic interest, no matter how often repeated, is never sexual
121. Jordan, No. 05-1485, slip op. at 10.
122. Id.
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123

harassment. Or a woman might think it is sexual harassment if she
observes males harassing other women in the office, but this, too, has
not been consistently treated as sexual harassment under the case
124
law. There is no reason why these women are any less deserving of
protection from retaliation for reporting conduct that they believe,
albeit erroneously and perhaps not even reasonably by some
measures, to be sexual harassment. Thus, this approach, too, fails to
provide sufficient protection to employees.
While Judge King’s approach may not provide a sufficiently broad
definition of “protected conduct” under the anti-retaliation
provision, the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Jordan contains an
additional lesson well worth considering. One point, albeit implicit,
on which both the majority and dissent agree is that, under at least
some circumstances, a woman’s complaint should be protected even
if the conduct she has thus far experienced cannot reasonably be
viewed as sexual harassment, at least as defined by existing case law.
What they disagree about is what those circumstances are, and
indeed, that is hardly surprising. The conflicting decisions in the
sexual harassment case law about what crosses the line, the gap
between the legal definition of sexual harassment and the public’s
knowledge of that definition, and the discrepancies between men
and women’s views as to what constitutes sexual harassment, all
operate to make it virtually impossible to provide a comprehensive
definition of what conduct would make a complainant’s views
reasonable. In other words, it is exceedingly difficult to determine
123. Compare O’Dell v. Trans World Entm’t Corp., 153 F. Supp. 2d 378, 386
(S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, No. 01-7807, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 14446 (2d Cir. July 16,
2002) (“Plaintiff has presented evidence that while Rosen was both a co-employee
and her supervisor, he repeatedly asked her out. Rosen made comments about her
appearance, sent her e-mails professing his love for her, called her at work and at
home, invited her to tour New York City with him, gave her three gifts, and played
her a song that she found offensive. This conduct, however pervasive, was not
sufficiently severe as to alter the conditions of her employment . . . .”) (citation
omitted), with Osorio v. Source Enters., No. 05 Civ. 10029 (JSR), 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 63032, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2006) (“Although defendants argue, rather
improbably, that these expressions of ‘romantic interest’ do not constitute
harassment, their counsel’s professed inability . . . to distinguish between romantic
interest and sexual harassment speaks more to counsel’s unworldliness than to any
realistic defense.”) (citations omitted).
124. See Christopher M. O’Connor, Stop Harassing Her or We’ll Both Sue: Bystander
Injury Sexual Harassment, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 501, 537 (1991) (describing sexual
harassment claims brought by those who were not targeted as being in their
“infancy”); cf. Robert A. Kearney, The Unintended Hostile Environment: Mapping the
Limits of Sexual Harassment Law, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 87, 88 (2004)
(describing a hypothetical woman who “believes she is the victim of sexual
harassment because her work environment is filled with sexual innuendo and
vulgarity,” but whose “claim may be doomed before it even gets started” because the
harassment was not “because of sex”).
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what beliefs are reasonable because beliefs about harassment are too
contextual and individual, and the law on sexual harassment is too
undefined and little-known.
It is unlikely then that the best solution is to try to craft some
intricate definition of what will satisfy the “reasonableness”
requirement; any attempt will likely provide too little guidance to
district courts or be insufficiently comprehensive. Instead, the best
solution may be to abandon altogether the requirement that a
plaintiff establish that her belief was reasonable. Certainly, there is
no reason that every complaint, even ones made in bad faith, should
be protected; to offer protection that broad would hardly serve the
purposes of Title VII. But limiting protection to those complaints
that are reasonable does not serve Title VII’s purposes either.
Although this requirement is designed to offer some protection to
125
employers, an employer’s most significant protection against a
retaliation claim is that he can always fire someone so long as the
complaint was not the cause. The anti-retaliation provision does not
make an employee who files a complaint immune from termination;
it only means that the employer cannot fire her because she filed the
126
complaint. Consequently, an employer will not be held liable if he
can establish that there was some lawful reason for the decision to
127
fire the plaintiff.
Courts could simply reframe the “reasonableness” requirement.
Instead of requiring a plaintiff to prove that her belief was
reasonable, courts could establish an affirmative defense to liability
that would place the burden on the employer to establish that the
plaintiff’s belief was unreasonable. Unfortunately, such an approach
is unlikely to provide sufficient protection to the victims of retaliation
because simply shifting the burden, in theory, does not change the
realities that make it difficult for plaintiffs to establish that their
beliefs are reasonable. There will still be a gap between the case law
and public perceptions; there will still be differences in the way
sexual harassment cases are resolved; and there will still be
differences in the ways men and women perceive harassing behavior.

125. Chambliss, supra note 11, at 21 (“Title VII . . . seeks to minimize economic
disruption, and opposition by employees obviously has the potential to be both costly
and disruptive for employers.”).
126. See, e.g., Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271-72 (2001) (per
curiam) (analyzing the temporal relationship between the alleged retaliation and the
time the complaint was filed).
127. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (explaining
that once the plaintiff has made a valid claim, the burden then shifts to the
defendant to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for termination).
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The burden may shift, but defendant employers will still be able to
point to all of these factors, and courts will likely continue to find that
the plaintiff’s belief was unreasonable. Thus, the tangible effect of
shifting the burden may be modest.
Courts could try to craft a stronger burden, requiring employers to
put forward specific evidence that it was unreasonable for an
individual in the plaintiff’s position to believe that the conduct
complained of was unlawful, but this approach is not without its
practical limitations. First, it is difficult to know what exactly this
approach would require of employers or how it would play out in
practice. Perhaps if an employer regularly held employee trainings
on sexual harassment with materials that accurately described the
current state of sexual harassment law and ensured that employees
participated in those trainings, those actions might be sufficient to
establish that the plaintiff should have known that her belief was
unreasonable. Alternatively, if the employer could establish that the
plaintiff filed repeated complaints after going through an
investigation process that apprised her of what conduct violates Title
VII, that showing might also prove sufficient to meet the employer’s
burden.
But there is a real danger that no matter how much courts
required of employers in theory, they would require little in practice.
As discussed at greater length below, the Supreme Court has
established that, under some circumstances, an employer can avoid
vicarious liability for sexual harassment by establishing that it
“exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any
sexually harassing behavior” and that the plaintiff failed to take
128
advantage of those opportunities. This requirement has been the
focus of much criticism because courts
are interpreting “reasonable care” in the first prong of the new
affirmative defense to require only minimal prevention efforts by
the employer. For example, some courts have held that the mere
promulgation of a policy, without any effective enforcement
mechanism, is enough to meet the employer’s burden of
129
reasonable care under prong one of the affirmative defense.

There is a real danger that an affirmative defense in this context
would suffer the same fate. In theory, it would encourage employers
to go to greater lengths to educate their workers, but in practice,

128. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
129. Martha S. West, Preventing Sexual Harassment: The Federal Courts’ Wake-Up Call
for Women, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 457, 461 (2002).
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courts would simply rubber-stamp “paper policies” and use them to
130
justify the dismissal of retaliation claims.
Second, there is a more fundamental problem with reframing the
“reasonableness” requirement as an affirmative defense. No matter
who has the burden of establishing whether the plaintiff’s belief was
reasonable, the requirement itself necessitates a baseline against
which the plaintiff’s belief may be measured and, thus, assumes the
reasonableness of that baseline. Yet that baseline may reflect
antedated notions and stereotypes about women, or male notions
about what is acceptable behavior in the workplace, and the antiretaliation provision, properly construed, should allow women to
speak out and challenge those ideas without fear of retaliation. If a
woman cannot speak out without fear of retaliation simply because
her employer has educated her about the existing case law, then she
is largely stripped of her ability to challenge that case law.
Thus, reframing the “reasonableness” requirement is not enough.
Instead, courts should reject the “reasonableness” requirement
altogether and recognize that employers have no right to fire an
employee, or otherwise retaliate against her, simply because she has
made a good faith effort to assert her rights under Title VII. Under
this approach, a plaintiff’s complaint would be protected unless the
employer can prove that it was made in bad faith. This approach will
be considerably easier for courts to apply, and for litigants to
understand, than the current “reasonableness” standard. In a
context in which it is critical that individuals be able to know ex ante
whether their conduct will be protected, a test that is easier to apply
and more protective of employee rights offers many advantages over
131
the current standard.
Moreover, because this approach would
130. The doctrine’s emphasis on training and educational programs has also
endured significant criticism because there is little evidence that such tools have
been effective in creating meaningful change in the workplace. See, e.g., Susan
Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention Is a Poor Substitute for a Pound of Cure: Confronting
the Developing Jurisprudence of Education and Prevention in Employment Discrimination
Law, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (2001) (chronicling training efforts taken by
employers and considering the negative effects of such efforts); Joanna L. Grossman,
The Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph of Form over Substance in Sexual Harassment
Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 3 (2003) (noting that “the rules of employer liability
for harassment are calculated to ensure that employers adopt basic policies and
procedures with respect to workplace harassment, not, surprisingly, to ensure that
they actually prevent it”); id. (“[T]here is little evidence in the vast social science
literature to support this emphasis on rule compliance. In fact, cookie-cutter sexual
harassment policies and procedures do not seem to have any reliably negative effect
on the incidence of harassment.”).
131. See generally Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985)
(discussing the relative pros and cons of rules and standards in different areas of
constitutional law).
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focus less on the plaintiff’s beliefs about the state of the law and more
on whether she was acting in good faith when she filed the
complaint, it would better reflect the purposes of the anti-retaliation
provision, namely, to protect those individuals who are trying to
132
protect their rights under Title VII.
III. THE BENEFITS OF THE NEW PARADIGM
That the courts’ current approach does not strike the best balance
becomes all the more clear when one considers the substantial
benefits a broader interpretation of the anti-retaliation provision
offers. Courts and commentators alike have recognized the critical
role that private complaints about discrimination and harassment
133
play in enforcement of Title VII.
To some extent, this role is
obvious—if individuals do not report harassment, past conduct will
not be punished. And this role is particularly important in the
context of Title VII enforcement given the EEOC’s relatively limited
134
role in enforcing Title VII’s protections.
132. In some respects, this approach might provide a broader defense against
retaliation claims than is currently available to employers. Consider this example:
An employee experiences clear sexual harassment for a sustained period of time, but
never files a complaint. Then, recognizing that she is about to be fired for some
unrelated reason, she files a complaint solely so she can bring a retaliation claim
after she is fired. Under the current test, this bad faith arguably provides the
employer no defense so long as the plaintiff reasonably believed that the conduct was
unlawful; however, under the alternative this Article advances, the employer could
argue that the complaint was made in bad faith, and if the jury accepted this
argument, the employer would not face liability for retaliation. See, e.g., Monteiro v.
Poole Silver Co., 615 F.2d 4, 8 (1st Cir. 1980) (noting that a complaint under Title
VII may not be “raised as a smokescreen in challenge to the supervisor’s legitimate
criticism”).
Although this presents some risk that employees might be penalized for waiting
too long to complain, the employer would still have to prove that the delay was not
the result of fear or confusion; he would have to prove that the plaintiff was acting in
bad faith. Moreover, the law already makes it risky for employees to wait too long to
report harassment. See infra Part III.A.
133. As one commentator has noted, if individuals do not report violations of the
Act, “[g]overnment agencies [will not adequately] fill the enforcement gap. The
agencies with employment law responsibilities have limited resources.” Hodges,
supra note 33, at 609; see Jolls, supra note 48, at 146 (“[T]he government is limited in
its ability to provide direct legal representation for employees, both as a matter of
theory and as an empirical matter.”).
134. Unlike some administrative agencies that play an active role in enforcing the
statute they are charged with enforcing, the EEOC lacks the power of enforcement.
See, e.g., Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1005 (5th Cir. 1969)
(“While it can subpoena witnesses, hold hearings, and attempt conciliation, it has no
authority to issue orders or compel enforcement. More than that, except [in limited
situations] . . . , [the] Government does not enter the litigation. The suit is between
private parties. The burden of enforcement rests on the individual through his suit
in Federal District Court.”); see also Marshall, supra note 13, at 73-74 (“In practice, if
not by design, Title VII places the initial burden of enforcing its substantive
provisions upon the individual victims of workplace discrimination. Although the
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But Title VII serves many purposes, and its anti-retaliation
provision, if interpreted with the appropriate breadth, can serve
those other purposes as well.
The approach this Article
advances⎯namely, rejecting the “reasonableness” requirement⎯will
enable the anti-retaliation provision to serve these purposes by
encouraging women to report harassment and, just as importantly, to
report it early. Early reporting is important not only because it can
help prevent additional harassment, but also because it is an
important means to achieve other valuable ends.
Early reporting can facilitate conciliation and informal resolution
of harassment claims, thereby avoiding the costs, monetary and
otherwise, that litigation imposes. Early reporting also enables
harassment victims to ameliorate the psychological and dignitary
harms that harassment causes. And, perhaps most importantly, early
reporting makes it easier to challenge and change the gender norms
and stereotypes that continue to pervade the workplace.
A. Preventing Harm
The Supreme Court has recognized the important prophylactic
role of Title VII enforcement, explaining that its “‘primary
objective[]’ like that of any statute meant to influence primary
135
conduct, is not to provide redress but to avoid harm.” To achieve
that end, the Supreme Court has encouraged individuals to report
136
discrimination and to report it early.
In fact, the Supreme Court
has done more than simply encourage individuals to report
discriminatory conduct; it has made such reporting a precondition to
137
employer liability.
The Court first gave the issue of employer liability sustained
138
attention in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, in which the plaintiff
alleged that her supervisors “repeatedly subject[ed] [her] . . . to
‘uninvited and offensive touching,’ by making lewd remarks, and by
speaking of women in offensive terms.” The plaintiff sued not only
139
her supervisors, but also her employer. The Supreme Court noted
that courts had universally taken the view that employers should be
[EEOC] has the authority to investigate and commence claims on its own initiative, it
does so with pronounced infrequency.”) (footnote omitted).
135. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998).
136. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998).
137. See infra notes 138-151 and accompanying text (detailing the Supreme
Court’s decision to allow employers an affirmative defense if the employee
unreasonably fails to invoke the employer’s remedial procedures).
138. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
139. Id. at 780.
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held liable where “discriminatory employment actions [had] tangible
results, like hiring, firing, promotion, compensation, and work
140
assignment.” Additionally, numerous cases in the courts of appeals
and district courts had held employers liable “on account of actual
knowledge by the employer, or high-echelon officials of an employer
organization, of sufficiently harassing action by subordinates, which
141
the employer or its informed officers have done nothing to stop.”
The Court then turned to agency law to consider why “harassing
behavior ought to be held within the scope of a supervisor’s
142
employment, and the reasons for the opposite view.”
The Court
rejected the view that employers should always be held liable for the
harassing behavior of their supervisors because such a view was
unsupportable under traditional agency law, and it would almost
certainly mean making employers liable for the harassing acts of co143
workers as well. The Court did, however, hold that “it makes sense
to hold an employer vicariously liable for some tortious conduct of a
supervisor” when that conduct was “made possible by abuse of his
144
supervisory authority.”
It then sought a limiting principle, noting
that “there is a sense in which a harassing supervisor is always assisted
145
in his misconduct by the supervisory relationship.”
The Court
ultimately held that “[w]hen no tangible employment action is taken,
146
a defending employer may raise an affirmative defense.”
In those
cases, an employer could avoid liability if he could establish that he
“exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any
sexually harassing behavior,” and that “the plaintiff employee
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm
147
otherwise.” The Court explained:
Although Title VII seeks “to make persons whole for injuries
suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination,” its
“primary objective” . . . is not to provide redress but to avoid
harm. . . . It would therefore implement clear statutory policy and
complement the Government’s Title VII enforcement efforts to
recognize the employer’s affirmative obligation to prevent

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 790.
Id. at 789.
Id. at 797.
Id. at 798-800.
Id. at 802.
Id.
Id. at 807.
Id.
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violations and give credit here to employers who make reasonable
148
efforts to discharge their duty.

This affirmative defense created a two-way street, placing a burden
149
The Court
not only on the employer, but also on the employee.
likened the requirement that an employee avail herself of available
complaint mechanisms to the general mitigation principles under the
150
law of damages. Thus, “[i]f the plaintiff unreasonably failed to avail
herself of the employer’s preventive or remedial apparatus, she
should not recover damages that could have been avoided if she had
151
152
done so.” In Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, decided the same
day as Faragher, the Court reaffirmed that “encourag[ing] employees
to report harassing conduct before it becomes severe or pervasive . . .
153
would also serve Title VII’s deterrent purpose.”
The Supreme Court’s language could not be clearer. Employees
should report sexual harassment not only early, but before it is even
harassment. But under the “reasonableness” standard, particularly as
interpreted by the D.C. and Fourth Circuits, a plaintiff cannot report
too early, lest a court determine that she could not have reasonably
believed that the conduct about which she was complaining was
unlawful. It truly is a frustrating “Catch-22” situation⎯report too
early, and the behavior is not harassment, but wait too long, and
there is little point in reporting because the employer may no longer
be held liable. Indeed, several courts have been unwilling to excuse
plaintiffs’ failure to report their complaints based on their claim that
154
they feared doing so might subject them to retaliation. And other
148. Id. at 805-06 (internal citation omitted).
149. In fact, Ellerth and Faragher have been criticized for “creat[ing] a legal rule
that from its inception was unlikely to promote the stated goal of prevention” by
“hinging liability on a response to harassment that is uncommon,” that is, formal
reporting of sexual harassment. Lawton, Operating, supra note 94, at 198.
150. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806.
151. Id. at 805-07. Anne Lawton argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in
Faragher
shift[ed] the focus from the organizational employer to the individual
harasser. . . . [which] in turn, affects the framing of the liability rules:
employers are rewarded for promulgating paper policies and procedures,
not for addressing the more difficult organizational causes of sexual
harassment. Thus, employers generally need do nothing but wait for victims
to report. The resulting liability scheme makes the victims of harassment
shoulder much of the burden for eliminating workplace harassment and
undermines what the Court considers to be Title VII’s primary purpose—the
deterrence of workplace discrimination.
Lawton, Bad Apple Theory, supra note 40, at 836-37 (internal footnotes omitted).
152. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
153. Id. at 764.
154. See West, supra note 129, at 479-86 (highlighting case law to show that “vague
and subjective fears do not justify a failure to complain”); see also Ann M. Henry,
Comment, Employer and Employee Reasonableness Regarding Retaliation Under the
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courts have required victims “to produce hard-to-find evidence of
specific facts justifying any failure on their part to complain to
employers . . . [thereby placing on] victims of sexual harassment . . . a
heavy production burden to justify a failure to file an internal
155
complaint.”
Thus, the “reasonableness” requirement creates a significant
tension in the case law’s treatment of Title VII reporting. By
rejecting the “reasonableness” requirement, it will be much easier for
employees to complain early without fear that they will have no legal
recourse if they then become the victims of retaliation. As a result, it
will be easier to achieve the purpose that the Supreme Court has
identified as one of Title VII’s most important: the prevention of
harm.
B. Informal Resolution
Early reporting is beneficial not only because it helps to prevent
harm, but also because it allows the employer and employee to
address problems before the conduct is so entrenched and the
relationship so damaged that it is difficult to address the situation in
an informal manner. The statute itself prioritizes informal resolution
of Title VII claims, providing that if the EEOC “determines . . . that
there is reasonable cause to believe that [a] charge is true, [it] shall
endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment
practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and
156
persuasion.”
Indeed, the very existence of the opposition clause
suggests Congress’ interest in promoting informal, internal
Ellerth/Faragher Affirmative Defense, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 553, 563 (1999) (“Several
courts applying the new affirmative defense have concluded that the employee acted
unreasonably when failing to complain of harassing behavior out of fear of
retaliation.”).
155. West, supra note 129, at 461. West notes that “federal courts are applying the
[Ellerth/Faragher] affirmative defense without any examination of women’s reluctance
to complain because of fear of reprisal.” Id. West’s proposed solution is “requir[ing]
an employer to demonstrate the effectiveness of its prevention policy by
documenting for employees the actions it took in addressing prior sexual harassment
complaints.” Id. at 497.
Courts have not yet determined whether it is appropriate to consider an
employer’s own policies in determining whether a plaintiff’s belief that she was the
victim of unlawful discrimination is reasonable. If courts do not consider such
materials, then a greater proliferation of materials that often (wisely) describe sexual
harassment in liberal terms could paradoxically result in more women making
complaints that are unprotected under Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision. West
also argues that “[p]ublic education is necessary to tell women about the federal
courts’ new legal requirement that women must complain before filing suit. At a
minimum, plaintiffs’ attorneys must educate women clients about the need to tell the
employer about the harassment before filing suit.” Id. at 522.
156. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2000).
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resolution of disputes under Title VII.
The Supreme Court, too,
has noted that it was “Congress’ intention to promote conciliation
158
and that
rather than litigation in the Title VII context,”
“[c]ooperation and voluntary compliance were selected as the
159
preferred means for achieving” Title VII’s goals.
Another benefit of abandoning reasonableness as a prima facie
element of a plaintiff’s retaliation claim is that it will encourage
individuals to file informal complaints with their employers rather
than turning immediately to the EEOC. Why is this so? Under the
current framework, a plaintiff who “unreasonably” opposes a practice
made unlawful under Title VII receives no protection under the
statute. However, if the plaintiff had skipped the informal complaint
and immediately “made a charge” with the EEOC, her conduct would
likely have been protected, no matter how unreasonable. The
160
Supreme Court suggested as much in Clark County. In that case, as
discussed earlier, the plaintiff alleged that her employer retaliated
against her for complaining about conduct that the Supreme Court
161
held she could not have reasonably believed was sexual harassment.
However, she not only complained, but also “fil[ed] charges against
[her employer] with the Nevada Equal Rights Commission and the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),” and she
alleged that her employer retaliated against her for filing those
162
charges and the lawsuit.
Having already held that the plaintiff
could not have reasonably believed that the underlying conduct was
unlawful, one might have expected the Supreme Court to dismiss all
of her retaliation claims. It did not, however. Instead, it went on to
consider whether the plaintiff’s filing of the charges was the cause of
163
her termination.
If the Court had determined that her employer
did fire her because she filed those charges, she would have prevailed
on her retaliation claim, even though she would not have prevailed
had she simply filed an informal, internal complaint with her
employer.
Several courts of appeals have adopted a similarly broad approach
in protecting individuals who file charges with the EEOC. For
example, the Fifth Circuit has held that a charge filed with the EEOC
is protected even if it contains “malicious material,” so long as “the
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Chambliss, supra note 11, at 21.
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998).
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974).
532 U.S. 268 (2001) (per curiam).
Id. at 270.
Id. at 271.
Id. at 271-72.
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charge otherwise satisfies the liberal requirements of a charge.”
The Fourth Circuit has also held that “[r]eading a reasonableness test
into section 704(a)’s participation clause would . . . undermine the
objectives of Title VII. . . . A straightforward reading of the statute’s
unrestrictive language leads inexorably to the conclusion that all
testimony in a Title VII proceeding is protected against punitive
165
employer action.”
The discrepancy between the protection afforded under the two
provisions led the Ninth Circuit to warn that “[a]ccusations made in
the context of charges before the Commission are protected by
statute; charges made outside of that context are made at the
166
Commentators have also noted that the greater
accuser’s peril.”
protections afforded by the “participation” clause should give
employees pause before “participating in their employer’s internal
167
investigations.”
An employee who knows that she may be
unprotected for lodging an informal complaint, but who knows that
filing a formal charge with the EEOC will accord her complete
protection, will likely do the latter. Thus, the “reasonableness”
requirement, especially when reasonableness is defined as narrowly as
it is by the D.C. and Fourth Circuits’ standards, encourages
individuals to file a charge with the EEOC without first notifying their
168
employers of the problem.
164. Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1007 (5th Cir. 1969). The
court explained that the case presented competing interests. “On the one hand is
the protection of the employer from damage caused by maliciously libelous
statements and on the other is protection of the employee from racial and other
discrimination.” Id. It also noted that
[i]n Title VII Congress sought to protect the employer’s interest by
directing that EEOC proceedings be confidential and by imposing severe
sanctions against unauthorized disclosure. The balance is therefore struck
in favor of the employee in order to afford him the enunciated protection
from invidious discrimination, by protecting his right to file charges.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
165. Glover v. S.C. Law Enforcement Div., 170 F.3d 411, 414 (4th Cir. 1999).
166. Vasconcelos v. Meese, 907 F.2d 111, 113 (9th Cir. 1990).
167. Larkin, supra note 53, at 1184.
168. See, e.g., Sias v. City Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 1978)
(noting that interpreting the protections of the “opposition” clause too narrowly
“would not only chill the legitimate assertion of employee rights under Title VII but
would tend to force employees to file formal charges rather than seek conciliation or
informal adjustment of grievances”); see also Henry, supra note 154, at 571 (“[C]ourts
should interpret Title VII’s retaliation provisions liberally so that employees feel they
can follow Ellerth and Faragher’s instruction to use internal complaint procedures
without making themselves targets for retaliation.”).
At least one commentator has argued that the affirmative defense established in
Faragher and Ellerth does not provide employees with the option of going first to the
EEOC. She explains that “[i]f the employee does not complain internally first, the
employer gains the protection of part (b) of the defense and potentially avoids
liability for the acts of its supervisors.” Larkin, supra note 53, at 1210. It is unclear
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Yet it is by filing internal complaints with their employers that
employees can most easily set in motion informal methods of
resolving their claims of discrimination. Multiple commentators have
169
extolled the benefits of informal resolution of Title VII claims,
noting that all involved in sexual harassment claims seek a quick
170
resolution to the dispute. Dorothy Larkin, for example, has argued
that encouraging employees to bypass internal complaint
mechanisms is troubling for two primary reasons. “First, resolving an
incident internally is often more efficient. Internal grievance
171
procedures are cheaper, faster, and more informal.” Because these
processes are often quicker and more informal than litigation, they
offer the additional benefit that the parties may be able to resolve
their claims without doing additional damage to their relationships.
Such a result is much less likely after the adversarial litigation process
has been initiated. Moreover, informal resolution may facilitate more
of a conversation about the behavior and why the plaintiff found it
offensive; this conversation may lead all parties to a greater
appreciation of each other and a better understanding of what is
acceptable workplace behavior. Such a conversation is also less likely
to occur in the context of formal litigation.
The second disadvantage Larkin identifies in formal resolution
mechanisms is that the “EEOC budget cuts have diminished the
172
effectiveness and efficiency of the charging procedures.” As Larkin
notes, these budget cuts came at the same time that the jurisdiction
of the EEOC was expanded with the enactment of the Americans with
173
Disabilities Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1991. These budget cuts
have impaired the ability of the EEOC to process these claims,
resulting in longer delays for those waiting for the EEOC to evaluate
that this is true, however, because the affirmative defense requires only that plaintiffs
notify their employer or otherwise mitigate their harm.
169. Yelnosky, supra note 38, at 598-99. Admittedly, there are drawbacks to
informal, private resolution of Title VII claims, see, e.g., Marjorie A. Silver, The Uses
and Abuses of Informal Procedures in Federal Civil Rights Enforcement, 55 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 482, 524 (1987) (asking “Whether informal dispute resolution interferes with the
eradication of discrimination. . . . [because] the focus on resolving individual
controversies [might] pose the danger of clouding a pervasive picture of
discrimination?”), but what is important for present purposes is that harassment
victims feel comfortable pursuing their claims informally if they so choose. Informal
resolution is almost certainly better than no resolution at all.
170. Bond, supra note 31, at 2501.
171. Larkin, supra note 53, at 1186.
172. Id. Larkin proposes that courts extend “participation” clause protection to
employees who participate in an internal investigation, regardless of whether or not a
formal charge has been filed with the EEOC. Id. at 1206-11. Even if courts were to
adopt this approach, it would not necessarily protect plaintiffs who simply file
internal complaints with their employer.
173. Id. at 1215.
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their claims. In the meantime, the resolution of claims hangs in the
balance; and as time passes, memories fade, and it may be more
174
difficult to achieve real justice at the end of the day. Moreover, if
the EEOC must investigate claims brought by individuals afraid to
complain to their employer, it will expend resources on many claims
that may ultimately turn out to be frivolous. Given the cuts to the
175
EEOC’s budget and its significant backlog, the EEOC has no
resources to waste, and the time and energy devoted to investigating
these claims will necessarily detract from the time available to
176
investigate more serious charges.
But it need not be this way. The language of the anti-retaliation
provision suggests no reason to impose a “reasonableness”
requirement on claims brought under one clause and not the other.
If plaintiffs are not required to establish that their beliefs are
reasonable, this gap in the amount of protection afforded under the
two clauses will be significantly eliminated, and individuals will be
much more likely to seek informal resolution of their Title VII claims.
C. Ameliorating Harm
Reporting violations of Title VII is important not only because it
allows for the punishment of those who committed the wrong, but
also because it is a step in the healing process for those who have
177
been victimized.
As many commentators have noted, one of the
primary harms of sexual harassment is the harm to the dignity and
178
This dignitary harm inheres in
self-respect of those it victimizes.
179
workplace harassment, no matter its source or method.
As one
commentator has noted:
[B]y humiliating, intimidating, tormenting, pressuring, or
mocking individuals in their places of work, sexual harassment is
an insult to the dignity, autonomy, and personhood of each victim;

174. Id.
175. Bond, supra note 31, at 2490 (noting that the EEOC then had a backlog of
80,000 cases).
176. Larkin, supra note 53, at 1216.
177. Quinn, supra note 40, at 1154-55.
178. See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 98, at 260 (explaining that in continental
Europe harassment in the workplace, sexual or non-sexual, is seen as a dignitary
harm); Ehrenreich, supra note 107, at 16 (noting that “[t]he harm of workplace
sexual harassment is a dignitary harm”).
179. See Ehrenreich, supra note 107, at 25 (“[T]he application of tort conceptions
of ‘dignity’ to workplace harassment rests not on an argument that courts should
adopt a particular conception of human dignity and personality, but instead rests on
a recognition that courts simply do assume that human beings have a certain
inherent dignity and that this dignity may not be violated, either by the state or by
other private individuals.”).
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such harassment violates each individual’s right to be treated with
the respect and concern that is due to her as a full and equally
180
valuable human being.

Title VII doctrine has been criticized for being insufficiently
attentive to these aspects of the harm of harassment. As one scholar
explained, “The neglect or discounting of emotion—an inevitable
effect when reason is the legal standard—not only mischaracterizes
the experience of sexual harassment but also cheapens the measure
181
of the plaintiff’s damage.”
The fact that the workplace is the setting for this mocking and
tormenting may also compound the psychological harm, in part
because it affects the victim’s sense of both personal and professional
182
self-worth.
One commentator maintained that “[s]exual
harassment at work has a public, communal dimension, even when
the offending behavior takes place behind a closed door. Being
humiliated at work can diminish settled beliefs about one’s
183
competence and relative status vis-à-vis other workers.”
Another
commentator has explained the significance of the workplace in
exacerbating the harms of harassment as follows: “[O]ne’s life takes
on publicly intelligible meaning largely through participation in
market work. The job not only constitutes one’s chief claim to
184
wealth, but is also the prime determinant of one’s status.”
The fact that women are often “comparative newcomers to many
kinds of work” may only compound these feelings of embarrassment
185
and humiliation when they are harassed in the workplace.
As
Kathryn Abrams has explained, “[M]any women view their position in
the workplace as marginal or precarious. They are likely to construe
180. Id. at 16; see Bernstein, supra note 99, at 450 (describing hostile environment
sexual harassment as “a type of incivility or . . . disrespect”). Richard Posner, too, has
noted that “[i]t is possible that the economic costs of sex discrimination law are
offset by gains not measured in an economic analysis—gains in self-esteem, for
example.” Posner, supra note 24, at 1335.
181. Bernstein, supra note 99, at 462.
182. See David C. Yamada, The Phenomenon of “Workplace Bullying” and the Need for
Status-Blind Hostile Work Environment Protection, 88 GEO. L.J. 475, 483 (2000)
(explaining that workplace bullying may lead to psychological effects such as
depression and low self-esteem); see also Quinn, supra note 40, at 1154 (noting that
victims of sexual harassment may have “lowered satisfaction with one’s job and one’s
life”).
183. Bernstein, supra note 99, at 490-91.
184. Thomas C. Kohler, The Employment Relation and Its Ordering at Century’s End:
Reflections on Emerging Trends in the United States, 41 B.C. L. REV. 103, 108 (1999); see
Estlund, supra note 25, at 73 (“Expression[s] of hatred, contempt, or disrespect on
the basis of race, sex, religion, or the like may inflict greater harm within the
workplace than in the public square partly because of the close and ongoing
personal engagement that the workplace compels.”).
185. Abrams, supra note 94, at 1204.

GOROD.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC

2007]

8/6/2007 10:15:25 PM

REJECTING “REASONABLENESS”

1513

disturbing personal interactions, stereotypical views of women, or
other affronts to their competence as workers as serious judgments
186
about their ability to succeed in the work environment.” The fact
that this mocking and humiliation may be part of a more general
environment of sex discrimination may compound these feelings.
While awareness of the discriminatory context may alleviate the
187
psychological harm to some victims, it may make it worse for others.
“[S]he may feel doubly undermined and attacked, both as an
individual and as a woman. Her suffering may be compounded if she
feels trapped—condemned always to be targeted for an attribute she
188
cannot change.”
Unsurprisingly then, many commentators report the serious effect
189
that sexual harassment may have on its victims. Sexual harassment
190
harms its victims “psychologically, physically, and financially,”
191
One commentator
producing “serious, even devastating, effects.”
has gone so far as to liken it to “a form of psychological pollution that
192
corrodes the well-being of . . . [its] victims.” Thus, many employees
who believe they have been the targets of sexual harassment will
report the behavior not only because they want to bring it to an end,
but because the very act of reporting is an effort to regain some

186. Id. at 1205; see James C. Chow, Comment, Sticks, Stones, and Simple Teasing:
The Jurisprudence of Non-Cognizable Harassing Conduct in the Context of Title VII Hostile
Work Environment Claims, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 133, 144 (1999) (arguing that even
“stray remarks” can “undermine the competence of women”); John J. Donohue III,
Advocacy Versus Analysis in Assessing Employment Discrimination Law, 44 STAN. L. REV.
1583, 1610 (1992) [hereinafter Donohue, Advocacy Versus Analysis] (stating that “the
heart of sexual harassment is the violation of personal autonomy”).
187. Rosa Ehrenreich explains this phenomenon:
[H]er awareness of having been targeted for discriminatory reasons may . . .
diminish her individual suffering, because she may feel better able to brush
off the harassment precisely because she knows that nothing she did or
could have done would have prevented it; she may feel empowered by her
awareness that she is integral to a broader struggle to demand that all
women be treated as full persons.
Ehrenreich, supra note 107, at 19-20.
188. Id. at 19.
189. See, e.g., Quinn, supra note 40, at 1154 (discussing the many harms that result
from sexual harassment including negative side effects in one’s private and
professional life); Yamada, supra note 182, at 483 (discussing the various
psychological and physical effects of workplace harassment, including “stress,
depression, mood swings, loss of sleep (and resulting fatigue), and feelings of shame,
guilt, embarrassment, and low self-esteem”).
190. Bond, supra note 31, at 2499.
191. Yamada, supra note 182, at 483. According to Yamada, “workplace bullying,”
a concept much broader than sexual harassment, is so damaging to both its victims
and business as a whole that he has advocated the adoption of a status-blind hostile
work environment protection. Id. at 523-29.
192. Donohue, Advocacy Versus Analysis, supra note 186, at 1588.
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control over the situation and to reclaim some of the dignity that they
193
have lost.
Terry Smith has noted the “psychological and physical injury” that
discrimination causes, and has suggested “that opposition conduct is
both a symptom of these injuries and a self-defense to avoid
194
continued harm.”
While Smith’s work focuses on racial
discrimination and discusses how it often engenders in its victims
195
antagonistic feelings toward society, there is reason to think that
women would experience similar feelings of outrage and frustration
when confronted with sexual harassment. Moreover, like minorities
who find themselves without a support system at work to help
196
alleviate the stress, women may also feel very much alone. As Smith
has noted, “the failure to engage in some form of opposition
conduct—that is, the internalization of anger over perceived
197
racism—threatens greater injury.”
Perhaps in response to concerns of this kind, continental Europe
“appears increasingly to view harassment as an issue primarily of
198
dignity rather than discrimination.”
One commentator has
suggested that “[t]he broad European enactment of anti-harassment
protection in recent months and years . . . may represent a . . .
decisive attempt to replace modern expressions of duelling with the
199
rule of law.”
The same commentator has questioned whether
“[t]he annual American toll of workplace homicides and assaults . . . ,
even clinical depression and drug abuse, might be seen as a
manifestation of these contemporary forms of ‘self-help’” in a society
whose legal system is not sufficiently concerned with respect and
200
While this expression of concern may appear to
dignitary harms.
over-dramatize the problem, it may be more right than many would
want to believe. The pervasiveness of sexual harassment is well193. See Ehrenreich, supra note 107, at 19-20 (noting that when a woman knows
she is being discriminated against, her knowledge of the situation may compel her to
recover not only her dignity, but the dignity of all women).
194. Smith, supra note 116, at 546; see id. at 548 (“Although the Harvard-Kaiser
Foundation study is significant for its verification that discrimination causes actual
injury, it also suggests that opposition conduct is necessary to prevent or reduce the
injury.”).
195. See id. at 549 (explaining that the “bitterness and anger” which results from
racial discrimination is felt not only by the discriminating individual, but by society as
a whole).
196. See id. (referencing a study which found that an African-American employee
who works in a non-racially diverse environment lacks social support to cope with
stress).
197. Id. at 566.
198. Coleman, supra note 98, at 260.
199. Id. at 287.
200. Id.
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established, and if women come to believe that they cannot speak
out about this harassment—that they cannot give voice to their
feelings of frustration, anger, and fear—it seems reasonable to
believe that those feelings, borne of the initial harassment but
compounded by the forced silence, will manifest themselves in other,
potentially destructive, ways.
Again, the “reasonableness” requirement, especially as interpreted
by the Fourth and D.C. Circuits, makes it more difficult for victims to
speak out and give voice to those feelings of frustration and sadness
and anger. Moreover, for those victims who do speak out, the
current state of the doctrine risks inflicting additional psychological
injury by describing as unreasonable the victim’s perceptions of what
she experienced and her feelings about it.
Eliminating the
requirement that the plaintiff bear the burden of establishing that
her belief was reasonable eliminates the suggestion, implicit in the
current doctrine, that the plaintiff’s feelings are not legitimate until
she can prove that they are accepted by society. Thus, this proposed
alternative not only helps prevent additional wrongs by encouraging
early reporting, but also does much to help the victims of workplace
discrimination and harassment recover from the wrongs they have
already experienced.
D. Changing Norms
Of course, the most significant, and most challenging, goal of Title
VII is not ameliorating the harms of harassment, or even responding
soon after it begins. Title VII’s greatest triumph would be realized if
it could actually affect broader change in workplaces around the
country by helping to create workplace environments in which both
men and women feel equally comfortable, and in which women feel
that they are treated like, and respected as, individuals. Multiple
commentators have noted that most women in the workplace, even
those who do not believe themselves to be the victims of explicit
sexual harassment or offensive behavior, nonetheless “do not feel
that they are treated as equals in the workplace, and survey data
202
indicate that they have reason for this belief.” While the specter of

201. See Ehrenreich, supra note 107, at 3 (noting that sexual harassment claims
increased fifty percent during the 1990s); Abrams, supra note 94, at 1197-98 (“Fiftythree percent of working women report having experienced behavior that they
describe as sexual harassment.”).
202. John J. Donohue III, Prohibiting Sex Discrimination in the Workplace: An
Economic Perspective, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1337, 1339 (1989) [hereinafter Donohue,
Prohibiting Sex Discrimination].
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sexual harassment is, in part, a cause of these feelings, the more
significant cause is the continued existence in the workplace of
gender norms and stereotypes.
The power of these norms cannot be overstated. “Informal social
norms not only constrain our conduct in relation to others, they also
204
shape our expectations about how others will behave toward us.”
Katherine Franke has described sexual harassment as “a sexually
discriminatory wrong because of the gender norms it reflects and
205
perpetuates.” She argues that other theories of sexual harassment
focus only on the harm done to women and fail to recognize that
“sexism . . . is something that affects and regulates us all, male and
female. . . . [T]he net effect of [sexist] conduct extends beyond any
particular case in that it solidifies what ‘real men’ and ‘real women’
206
should be.”
The perpetuation of these norms may reflect “part of a
discriminatory backlash: a last-ditch effort by men to preserve the
207
playgrounds of male power from female competitors.” While “[n]ot
all workplace harassment of women is motivated by a desire—explicit
or implicit—to keep women out of male-dominated jobs,” Rosa
Ehrenreich argues that “failure to recognize that much—perhaps
most—workplace harassment of women is motivated by
discriminatory male attitudes would be to miss the forest for the
208
trees.”
Vicki Schultz, too, has noted that “[h]arassment has the
form and function of denigrating women’s competence for the
purpose of keeping them away from male-dominated jobs or
209
incorporating them as inferior, less capable workers.”
203. Abrams, supra note 94, at 1208; see id. (“Sexual inquiries, jokes, remarks, or
innuendos sometimes can raise the spectre of coercion, but they more predictably
have the effect of reminding a woman that she is viewed as an object of sexual
derision rather than as a credible coworker.”).
204. Krieger, supra note 3, at 478.
205. Franke, supra note 71, at 693.
206. Id. at 763; see Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J.
1683, 1689 (1998) [hereinafter Schultz, Reconceptualizing] (“[M]any men are harmed
at work by gender-based harassment that fits only uneasily within the parameters of a
sexualized paradigm.”).
207. Ehrenreich, supra note 107, at 16.
208. Id.
209. Schultz, Reconceptualizing, supra note 206, at 1755. In addition, Schultz
explains that harassment does not need to be sexual to maintain a male-dominated
work place:
To render visible many of the nonsexual forms of harassment that remain
hidden, we should also recognize that much of the behavior that creates a
hostile work environment is conduct that has the purpose or effect of
undermining the perceived or actual competence of women (and some
men) who threaten the idealized masculinity of those who do the work. By
engaging in hostile work environment harassment, incumbent male workers
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While Title VII has almost certainly helped to facilitate some
change in views “about the propriety of certain forms of workplace
210
harassment,” the fact remains that “because men still exercise
control over most workplaces, their views of sexual behavior in the
211
workplace remain the norm, the measure of ‘business as usual.’”
Thus, “[s]exual harassment is a potent reminder that the entry of
women into the workplace is the beginning, not the end, of a social
212
transformation.”
Indeed, to Kathryn Abrams, the effort to change these norms
represents the second major fight of the battle for gender equality in
213
the workplace. She writes that
one can describe the struggle for gender equality in the workplace
as having two overlapping phases: the first concerned with ending
the exclusion of women from many types of employment, and the
second concerned with transforming the male-centered norms that
created both the exclusion and the workplace as women now find
it. . . . [T]he present day finds us not at the end of the path, but
214
navigating a crucial bend in the road.

To her, these norms have tangible consequences in the
215
workplace.
“Women who fought for access to jobs, property, and
the political arena have discovered that increased access alone does
not create conditions in which equality is possible. Women often are
channeled into jobs that accord them little respect and few
216
opportunities for advancement.” In addition,
lay claim to certain forms of work and the competence entailed as
specifically masculine forms of labor.
Id. at 1762. She further explains that
much of the gender-based hostility and abuse that women (and some men)
endure at work is neither driven by the desire for sexual relations nor even
sexual in content. Indeed, many of the most prevalent forms of harassment
are actions that are designed to maintain work—particularly the more highly
rewarded lines of work—as bastions of masculine competence and authority.
Id. at 1686-87. Moreover, she contends that “harassment functions as a way of
undermining women’s perceived competence as workers.” Id. at 1712.
210. Coleman, supra note 98, at 248.
211. Abrams, supra note 94, at 1203.
212. Id. at 1197.
213. See id. at 1186 (explaining that after gaining access to greater employment
opportunities, women must alter the norms of male dominance within the
workplace).
214. Id.; see Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 460 (2001) (“‘Second generation’ claims involve
social practices and patterns of interaction among groups within the workplace that,
over time, exclude nondominant groups.”).
215. See Abrams, supra note 94, at 1187 (finding that male-centered workplace
norms negatively affect relationships among co-workers, hinder the opportunities for
women to advance professionally, and subject women to sexual harassment).
216. Id. at 1184-85; see Deborah A. Calloway, St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks:
Questioning the Basic Assumption, 26 CONN. L. REV. 997, 1025 (1994) (“While it is true
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[t]hese norms shape intangibles such as the “appropriate”
professional demeanor: the tone of voice, air of command, and
quickness to accommodate or anger that mark a “successful”
employee. They also dictate the acceptable forms of professional
camaraderie, and prescribe the boundaries between the workplace
217
and the rest of the world . . . .

How then to effect greater change? How to transform a formal
equality into a meaningful one in which all doors are open—and
218
wide-open—to all people? Certainly the courts have a role to play.
But there is evidence that these norms exist not just in the workplace,
219
but in the courts as well. As noted above, the fact that most judges
are men means they may subconsciously be more inclined to side
220
with employers in sexual harassment cases.
In fact, one empirical
analysis of judicial decision-making found that “female judges
mattered to outcomes in Title VII sexual harassment and sex
discrimination cases. . . . Although plaintiffs lost in the majority of
cases . . . , they were significantly more likely to win when a female
221
judge was on the bench.”
Moreover, only if women feel comfortable reporting behaviors they
find offensive when the harassment first occurs will cases presenting
such conduct make their way to court, allowing these views to be
challenged. Only then will judges have the opportunity, should they
be so inclined, to condemn more and additional types of offensive
that anti-discrimination laws prohibit discriminatory conduct, not prejudice or
stereotypes, much discriminatory conduct is based on stereotypical attitudes about
the characteristics and qualifications of women and minorities.”); Posner, supra note
24, at 1317-21 (noting that among the causes of discrimination against women are
ignorance and generalizations about the average working woman); cf. Estlund, supra
note 25, at 73 (stating that expressions of hostility in the workplace “may undermine
workplace equality and reinforce occupational segregation”). As Donohue and
Heckman have noted in the context of race, much of Title VII’s value came from
“overcom[ing] the informal enforcement mechanisms of the [segregationist] norm
or forc[ing] people who do not share the law’s premise of equality to confront that
view.” John J. Donohue III & James Heckman, Re-Evaluating Federal Civil Rights Policy,
79 GEO. L.J. 1713, 1729 (1991).
217. Abrams, supra note 94, at 1189. Abrams argues for “an approach that
transforms the dominant male norms by integrating norms that reflect women’s
needs and experiences.” Id. at 1192.
218. See Krieger, supra note 3, at 478 (finding that case law advances and changes
informal social norms).
219. See Abrams, supra note 94, at 1203 (explaining that many court opinions in
sexual harassment cases display male-centered norms that view such harassment as
“harmless amusement, or as the treatment women should expect when they push
their way into the workplace”).
220. Id.; see Krieger, supra note 3, at 485 (“The operation of subtle cognitive and
motivational biases which distort social perception and judgment may further
constrain the implementation of transformative law.”).
221. Jennifer L. Peresie, Note, Female Judges Matter:
Gender and Collegial
Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759, 1786-87 (2005).
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behavior, and only then will we, perhaps, begin to see changes in the
case law. To the extent that judicial decisions and definitions do help
to define what is acceptable and what is not, the fact that women may
be deterred from bringing these claims may mean that we are losing
one possible means by which we can bring about change in societal
222
norms and stereotypes.
But history teaches that a conversation limited to the confines of
the courtroom is not enough. If the social transformation is to
continue, we will need a larger, national conversation about which
223
behaviors are acceptable and which are not. As one commentator
has noted, “[D]irect complaint of harassment is crucial. This is true
whether we consider the instrumental power of the law (‘law as tool’)
224
or its often more complex rhetorical and discursive power.”
If we
assume that some sexually harassing behavior is not motivated by the
intent to harm women, but simply derives from a misunderstanding
about what is offensive, this behavior can be changed, but only if men
are alerted to what conduct women find offensive. But a meaningful
conversation is only possible if there are multiple actors speaking and
multiple voices being heard, and this is especially true in the context
of sexual harassment where women see things so much differently
than men, and where what changes the “conditions of employment”
for a woman may seem trivial or insignificant to her male co-worker.

222. See Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of
Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1749, 1757 (1990) [hereinafter Schultz, Telling Stories] (“Judges’
interpretations of sex segregation enter a broader stock of cultural knowledge that
organizes people’s experience and gives meaning to what we see when we observe
men and women doing separate tasks in everyday life.”).
223. See Sturm, supra note 214, at 462-63 (“[N]ormative elaboration occurs
through a fluid, interactive relationship between problem solving and problem
definition within specific workplaces and in multiple other arenas, including but not
limited to the judiciary.”). However, a national conversation must also create
individual conversations to produce social change. As Cynthia S. Estlund explains in
the context of race relations:
We would do much to heal racial divisions if people of different races, and
particularly black and white citizens, had more conversations—about race
and, perhaps more importantly, not about race—with each other. A
“national conversation about race” may ultimately do less to improve race
relations in this country than would millions of individual conversations
among people of different races.
Estlund, supra note 25, at 50.
224. Quinn, supra note 40, at 1154 (citation omitted). Quinn goes on to explain
that “[i]f one fails to name the harm as sexual harassment, the law is immobilized
both ideologically and instrumentally. It is this instance that informs the present
analysis, the process by which the law is ‘stilled’—both instrumentally and
rhetorically—by everyday tactical maneuvers that serve to preclude this requisite
naming.” Id. at 1155.
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As long as we discourage women from speaking out and identifying
the behavior that they find offensive, this conversation will be
meaningless, and we will be unable to replace male-driven norms
with a more realistic assessment of what all members of society find
offensive. Indeed, if women are reluctant to report the conduct that
they believe crosses the line, and are thus silenced, that silence will in
effect reinforce existing norms about what is and is not acceptable in
225
the workplace. And to the extent that women do feel comfortable,
or at least more comfortable, reporting offensive behavior once it has
become “severe or pervasive,” that later reporting may lead some to
conclude that the earlier harassment was not offensive, and that the
226
pre-existing norms are the correct ones.
Thus, again, the “reasonableness” requirement and the narrow
ways in which both the Fourth and D.C. Circuits have applied it are
cause for great concern because they threaten to make it more
difficult for women to speak out, and to speak out early. The fact
that women will not be speaking openly about what behavior they
find inappropriate and offensive will limit the effectiveness of any
conversation about appropriate workplace norms and will make it
more difficult for norms and stereotypes to change. As noted above,
this maintenance of the status quo will make it more difficult for
women to prevail in court and less likely for there to be meaningful
change in offices around the country.
And this problem feeds on itself.
The lack of reporting
perpetuates the existing norms, and the existence of those norms
then demoralizes women and discourages them from seeking to
227
engage in behavior that will change the norms.
As one
225. See Bond, supra note 31, at 2494-95 (“Because men have historically been
over-represented in positions of power in the workplace, their views are often
considered normative. Therefore, use of the reasonable person standard runs the
risk of validating the majority male perspective of acceptable on-the-job behavior.”).
226. See Donohue, Prohibiting Sex Discrimination, supra note 202, at 1355-56 (“In the
absence of legal protection, the response to sexual harassment will frequently be
either to quietly endure or to quietly leave—neither of which would provide useful
information to the employer or to prospective workers.”).
227. See Estlund, supra note 25, at 73 (“[E]xpression [of hatred, contempt, or
disrespect in the workplace] may undermine workplace equality and reinforce
occupational segregation. Such expression may also poison the workplace as a
forum for pluralistic exchange and destroy the possibility of constructive
engagement.”); cf. David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in
Employment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEO. L.J. 1619, 1629-30 (1991)
(noting in the context of racial differences that it is particularly troubling “when one
social disadvantage after another accumulates on one racial group” that has
historically been the victim of prejudice because, in part, “it severely demoralizes the
members of the group”). Moreover, even if women wanted to speak out, the
existence of these norms may make the workplace an uncomfortable environment in
which they do not feel comfortable doing so. Estlund, supra note 25, at 73.
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commentator has explained, “women’s work aspirations are
shaped . . . primarily by the structures of incentives and social
228
relations within work organizations.” Thus, women may internalize
these norms and submit passively to pre-existing ideas about what
women can and cannot do in the workplace. And then when women
do not speak out as a result, when they are passive and submissive,
they only reconfirm the view that women are not assertive, not
capable of control, not deserving of the positions and the respect that
229
they have been traditionally denied. In other words, they behave in
ways that further entrench the ideas that society already has about
women—and, indeed, that many women have about themselves.
The role that gender norms play in our workplaces is complex,
pervasive and, perhaps most importantly, persistent. These norms
are entrenched, the product of centuries of one way of thinking and
the experiences that that way of thinking produced. While it is
unquestionable that these norms have begun to change—and Title
VII has played a significant role in that process—much remains to be
done. The norms that remain are likely the most intractable,
and
therefore changing them will prove to be the most challenging.
Commentators have noted that the structure of employer liability for
sexual harassment is such that it places more emphasis on “policies
and procedures” and on “providing sexual harassment training to
their employees . . . [r]ather than providing employers with
incentives to address the predictors of workplace harassment, such as
230
the organization’s culture and the job gender context.”
Thus,
changes to organizations’ cultures and contexts will have to come
from other directions. A conversation about those contexts and

228. Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 222, at 1816; see Quinn, supra note 40, at
1160-61 (noting that sexual harassment can “reinforce[] . . . power relations through
the play of gendered and sexual identities”).
229. Schultz explains that traditional gender roles reduce women’s status in the
workplace:
By portraying women as naturally “feminine” creatures who approach the
workworld with preordained preferences for suitably “feminine” work, courts
validate sexist views of women as inauthentic workers fit only for the lowestpaying, least-challenging jobs. By portraying work itself as naturally
“masculine” or “feminine,” they legitimate the structures and processes
through which employers construct work and work aspirations in gendered
terms.
Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 222, at 1840; see Hoyman & Stallworth, supra note
34, at 63 (noting that the fact that “[h]istorically, women have not fared well in the
law. . . . reflects society’s perception of the proper place of women”).
230. Lawton, Operating, supra note 94, at 198. Lawton notes that these policies and
procedures amount to “file cabinet compliance” and “have little effect on the
incidence of workplace harassment.” Id.
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cultures would be a good place to start—if the courts will let it
happen.
CONCLUSION
Although some commentators have criticized the courts for
231
intentionally attempting to limit Title VII’s protective reach, the
D.C. Circuit’s decision in George hardly appears to be an active
attempt to limit the protective scope of Title VII’s “opposition
clause.” To the contrary, it appears more likely to have been an
attempt to craft a relatively easy way to deal with a frequently
recurring problem, that is, identifying when an employee’s
harassment complaint is reasonable. Faced with increasingly heavy
dockets, it is understandable why courts might prefer easy solutions
to difficult ones. Yet, as discussed above, the “reasonable juror” test
adopted in George is too easy, threatening to unnecessarily and
inappropriately limit the ability of individuals to report what they
believe to be discrimination without fear of retaliation. In doing so, it
threatens to limit the extent to which Title VII’s prohibitions are
enforced, and just as importantly it threatens to undercut Title VII’s
other critical, if less tangible, purposes.
But what is the alternative? How should courts determine the
objective reasonableness of a plaintiff’s belief that she was the victim
of sexual harassment? As much as anything else, the courts’ decisions
in George and Jordan reveal that there is no good way to define which
beliefs are reasonable and which are not, especially in the context of
hostile work environment claims. And these difficulties in definition
have serious consequences in this context because they mean that
individuals are less likely to report harassment, especially in its
earliest stages, thereby compromising the ability of the antiretaliation provision to advance the goals of Title VII. Balanced
against these negatives, the benefits of requiring plaintiffs to establish
the reasonableness of their beliefs as part of their prima facie
retaliation case are too few, especially when those benefits can be
served almost as well by allowing employers an affirmative defense to
liability when they can establish that the plaintiff’s complaint was
made in bad faith.
Title VII has been the source of acclaim, controversy, and
considerable commentary. Its anti-retaliation provision has been the

231. Cf., e.g., Symposium, Civil Rights Act, supra note 34, at 793-94 (noting that
some Title VII lawyers had “stopped bringing Title VII cases because they got such a
hostile reception from the federal bench that they couldn’t do it any more”).
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subject of less commentary, but it is no less critical. Indeed, in some
respects, it is even more critical because of the fundamental and
multi-faceted support it provides for Title VII’s substantive antidiscrimination provision. Title VII may not be perfect, and its ability
to achieve equality in the workplace may be limited by various forces
external to the statute itself, but in its anti-retaliation provision it has
an internal source of support that should not be discounted, at least
so long as the courts do not diminish it to nothing. Courts should
recognize that the anti-retaliation provision not only helps to prohibit
discrimination, but also acts to preserve the freedom to speak and to
heal. In determining how much opposition activity to protect, the
courts should interpret the provision so that its breadth is
commensurate with the many purposes it serves.

